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Abstract 
 
The focus of this thesis is the impact of business groups on company performance and the 
evolution of market structure in Russia. Business groups’ control of a large share of 
industry is a distinguishing and controversial characteristic of the Russian transition. This 
thesis contributes to the quantitative analysis of the economic impact of Russian business 
groups.  
 
The first chapter analyses the gap between control and ownership in Russian companies. 
We find a significant difference in the size and structure of the total gap compared to the 
component resulting from the use of pyramidal ownership structures. Our results suggest 
that standard estimators that account only for the pyramidal effect might be biased by the 
presence of endogeneity and measurement error problems. The second chapter examines 
the impact of business groups on company performance. In a majority of specifications, 
including the use of instrumental variables, we find that business groups have a 
consistently insignificant impact on the productivity growth of companies they control. 
This conclusion contrasts with previous studies of the impact of Russian business groups 
on firm performance. The third chapter tests the applicability of Sutton’s sunk costs 
theory of market concentration to Russian industries. Our results are consistent with 
Sutton’s theoretical predictions that concentration in industries with endogenous sunk 
costs does not decrease with market size. 
 iii
Acknowledgements  
 
First of all I would like to thank my main supervisor Mark Schaffer for his enduring 
support and guidance. I am greatly indebted to him for all his time and enthusiasm, his 
constructive and motivating feedback without which this research would not be possible. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my second supervisor David Brown for his 
insightful comments and suggestions.  The financial support of the Heriot-Watt 
University is gratefully acknowledged.  I also wish to thank my husband, Bertrand 
Lucotte, who was the first and very critical reader of my final chapters, substantially 
improving their comprehensibility. I am also very grateful to my parents and friends for 
their continuous support and encouragement.  
 iv
ACADEMIC REGISTRY 
Research Thesis Submission 
 
 
Name: Anna Shabunina 
School/PGI: Management and Languages 
Version:  (i.e. First, 
Resubmission, Final) 
Final  Degree Sought 
(Award and 
Subject area) 
PhD - Economics 
 
 
Declaration  
 
In accordance with the appropriate regulations I hereby submit my thesis and I declare that: 
 
1) the thesis embodies the results of my own work and has been composed by myself 
2) where appropriate, I have made acknowledgement of the work of others and have made 
reference to work carried out in collaboration with other persons 
3) the thesis is the correct version of the thesis for submission and is the same version as any 
electronic versions submitted*.   
4) my thesis for the award referred to, deposited in the Heriot-Watt University Library, should 
be made available for loan or photocopying and be available via the Institutional 
Repository, subject to such conditions as the Librarian may require 
5) I understand that as a student of the University I am required to abide by the Regulations of 
the University and to conform to its discipline. 
 
* Please note that it is the responsibility of the candidate to ensure that the correct version of 
the thesis is submitted. 
 
Signature of Candidate:  Date
: 
 
 
 
Submission  
 
Submitted By (name in 
capitals): 
 
 
Signature of Individual 
Submitting: 
 
 
Date Submitted: 
 
 
 
For Completion in Academic Registry 
 
Received in the Academic 
Registry by (name in capitals): 
 
Method of Submission  
(Handed in to Academic Registry; 
posted through internal/external mail): 
 
 
E-thesis Submitted 
(mandatory from November 
2008) 
 
Signature: 
 
 Date
: 
 
 v
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ii 
Acknowledgements iii 
Research Thesis Submission iv 
Table of Contents v 
List of Tables vi 
List of Figures vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Explaining the Control-Ownership Gap in Russian Companies 4 
2.1 Motivation 4 
2.2 Literature Review 9 
2.3 Data and Variables Description 16 
2.4 Decomposition of Control-Ownership Gap: Methodology 18 
2.5 Ownership Concentration of the Russian Companies 21 
2.6 A Cross-Country Comparison of the Control Ownership Gap 24 
2.7 Control-Ownership Gap in Russian Companies 26 
2.8 Conclusion 33 
Chapter 3: Business Groups Impact on Performance of Companies 34 
3.1 Motivation and literature review 34 
3.2 Data and Variables 43 
3.3 Russian Business Groups: Definition and International Comparison 45 
3.4 Ownership effect on performance: methodology 47 
3.4.1 Estimating TFP in levels 47 
3.4.2 Estimating TFP in growth rates 50 
3.4.3 Using instrumental variables 54 
3.5 Business Group Effect on Performance:  TFP in levels 55 
3.5.1 Cobb-Douglas production function 55 
3.5.2 Comparing results with Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) 57 
3.5.3 Alternative functional forms: owner-specific and translog. 59 
3.5.4 Using instruments to address possible endogeneity of ownership 64 
3.6 Business Group Effect on Growth: TFP in growth rates 67 
3.6.1 Estimating productivity growth rates 67 
3.6.2 Comparing first difference and long difference estimates 69 
3.6.3 Capital coefficient sensitivity test to the measurement noise 70 
3.7 Conclusion 72 
Chapter 4 Market Structure Evolution in Russia 73 
4.1 Motivation and literature review 73 
4.2 Model description 77 
4.3 Measuring market concentration in Russian industries 80 
4.4 Lower bound for market concentration 88 
4.4.1 Lower bound estimation: 32 industries 89 
4.4.2 Lower bound estimation: 60 industries 93 
4.4.3 Testing the effect of industry sample 95 
4.4.4 Lower bound estimation: time shift 95 
4.5 Conclusion 98 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 99 
References 102 
Appendix 108 
 
 vi
List of Tables  
 
Table 1: Literature overview on control ownership gap 14 
Table 2: Length of the ownership chain in pyramidal schemes 21 
Table 3: Ownership stake of the main stakeholder by institutional type 23 
Table 4: Decomposition of control-ownership gap 26 
Table 5: Frequency table for the pyramidal and control variable effects 27 
Table 6: Frequency table for pyramidal and total control effects 27 
Table 7: Decomposition of control-ownership gap by the type of owner 28 
Table 8: Number of companies by the sources of control ownership gap and the type of 
owner 29 
Table 9: Determinants of the control-ownership gap existence (probit estimation) 30 
Table 10: Determinants of the control-ownership gap size (tobit estimation) 31 
Table 11: Determinants of the control-ownership gap size (Heckman model) 32 
Table 12: Selected empirical literature results of the business group effect 41 
Table 13: Summary statistics and data cleaning description 44 
Table 14: Sample statistics, 2003 by the type of owner 45 
Table 15: International comparison of Russian business groups 46 
Table 16: Comparison of estimate biases 52 
Table 17: Cross-section estimation of the TFP in levels for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 
versus pooled OLS 55 
Table 18: Between and pooled OLS estimation of TFP in levels 56 
Table 19: Testing difference in coefficients 57 
Table 20: Cross-section estimation of  TFP in levels: Guriev ‘ and Rachinsky’s data 58 
Table 21: Testing difference in coefficients for two samples 59 
Table 22: Testing the equality of capital elasticity coefficients 60 
Table 23: Testing the equality of labour elasticity coefficients 60 
Table 24: Joint test of differences in capital and labour elasticities 61 
Table 25: Testing sample differences in capital, labour, capital intensity 61 
Table 26: Testing sample differences in capital, labour, capital intensity 62 
Table 27: Estimation of translog production function 63 
Table 28: Coefficients of one-factor logit regressions with business group ownership as 
dependent variable 65 
Table 29: 2SLS estimation results: accounting for the endogeneity 65 
Table 30: Estimating Total Factor Productivity in growth rates 68 
Table 31: Estimating Total Factor Productivity in growth rates: between estimate 68 
Table 32: Estimating TFP in growth rate: long differences 69 
Table 33: F-test for the equality of the coefficients as estimated by the first differences 
versus long differences estimations. 69 
Table 34: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha= 0.2 70 
Table 35: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha=0.15 71 
Table 36: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha=0.1 71 
Table 37: Market size and market concentration in 1991 and 2003 82 
Table 38: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 1991 90 
Table 39: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 2003 90 
Table 40: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 2003 91 
Table 41: Sample statistics for 60 industries 94 
Table 42: Lower bound estimation for market concentration for more disaggregated 
sectors 94 
Table 43: Testing sensitivity of our results to the sample composition 95 
Table 44: Estimating the lower bound for market concentration change 96 
 vii
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Cash-flow rights of main stakeholder 22 
Figure 2: Cash-flow rights of main stakeholder weighted by size of the company 23 
Figure 3: Separation of control and ownership in East Asia countries and Russia 25 
Figure 4: Market concentration (CR4) in 1991 and 2003 83 
Figure 5: Market concentration (CR4) in 1991 and 2003 83 
Figure 6: Change in market concentration from 1991 to 2003, 85 
Figure 7: Market concentration change in the homogeneous industries 86 
Figure 8: Market concentration change in industries with intensive advertising 86 
Figure 9: Lower bound for market concentration in 1991 by the type of industry 92 
Figure 10: Lower bound for market concentration in 2003 93 
Figure 11: Lower bound shift from 1991 to 2003 by the type of industry 97 
 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In many former socialist economies market transformation has created a specific class of 
large private owners with the characteristics of business groups. In Russia, the history of 
business group formation, their role in the economy and the politics of the country has 
been very controversial. The first major attempt to quantify the economic role of the 
Russian business groups, also often referred to as oligarchs, was made by the World Bank 
study in 2003. It resulted in a unique dataset that provided the opportunity to analyze 
quantitatively the ownership structure of business groups, their effect on firms’ 
performance and the evolution of the industry structure. In this thesis we combine two 
datasets, the World Bank ownership dataset and the Russian industrial registry, to study 
three different aspects of the phenomenon of business groups: 1) the control and 
ownership concentration and leverage mechanisms within companies; 2) the business 
group effect on company productivity; 3) and market structure evolution. 
 
Early research on the economic significance of separation between ownership and 
control, e.g., Berle and Means (1932), characterized the modern firm as having a highly 
dispersed ownership structure. This characterization was questioned by the empirical 
literature in the 80s and 90s which demonstrated that concentrated ownership is 
widespread. This finding shifted academic interest from the analysis of manager-owner 
agent problems to the study of the consequences of control leverage exercised by major 
shareholders. 
 
In the empirical literature, the control-ownership gap is predominantly measured as a 
leverage resulting from pyramidal ownership structures. However, in practice controlling 
stakeholders use additional methods that often escape precise measurement, e.g. affiliated 
management, control over supply and delivery networks, control over debt arrears. This 
chapter fills the gap in the literature by estimating the total control-ownership gap and 
decomposing it into two effects: pyramidal and informal.  
 
Theoretical models predict a negative impact from the control-ownership gap on the 
performance of companies. Empirical surveys on this topic have lead to contradictory 
conclusions. This might be explained by an omission of the non-pyramidal component of 
the control-ownership gap in these estimations. 
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The main contribution of chapter 2 is a unique quantitative analysis of the control-
ownership gap based on a large sample of Russian companies. This unique dataset 
enables us to decompose the total control-ownership gap into a pyramidal and an informal 
component. Thus we are in a position to assess the validity of the widely assumed 
hypothesis that the pyramidal component can be used as a proxy variable for measuring 
the total control-ownership gap. Our results indicate that these two components have 
significantly different effects, and that the usually omitted non-pyramidal element is 
correlated with some of the common explanatory variables. This finding suggests that the 
use of a pyramidal only control-ownership gap may result in biased estimates of 
parameters. 
 
The second chapter also details the results of estimations of the ownership and control 
structure in large Russian companies. Business groups appear to have the largest control 
leverage over ownership level, and exercise it mainly via informal channels. Foreign 
owners often have the smallest difference between control and ownership. We find that 
on average less than half of the control ownership gap is due to the commonly assumed 
factor, pyramidal structures.  
 
In the next chapter we use information on the ownership and control to identify the 
ultimate major owners and study their impact on the performance of the companies. We 
focus our attention on a particular group of private owners - large business groups.  
Although business groups in transition economies draw significant interest of economists, 
the number of works with systematic quantitative analysis remains limited. The third 
chapter aims to fill this gap.  
 
Both theoretical and empirical literature on business groups are divided regarding their 
impact on firms’ productivity. Many studies of East Asian business groups (often after the 
1998 crisis) find evidence of a negative business group effect due to conglomerate 
inefficiencies. Studies of other emerging economies, however, show that business groups 
can have a positive effect on companies’ performance when they take on the role of failed 
or underdeveloped institutions in the country.  
 
A noteworthy work by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) showed that business groups in 
Russia have positive effect on companies’ productivity growth. To make our results 
comparable to previous studies we measure business group effect by introducing dummy 
 3
variables in total productivity function; we expand the analysis by including larger time 
period and using different estimation methods that address existing problems. In 
particular, we use instrumental variables to address possible endogeneity problems and 
long difference estimator to reduce the impact of measurement errors.    
 
Business groups’ impact on the company productivity growth appeared to be consistently 
insignificant in the majority of specifications. This is in contrast with previous findings 
based on a single cross-section model specification.  
 
In chapter four we shift our focus to the market structure evolution and use our 
knowledge of the ownership structures to calculate the concentration ratios that take into 
account hidden horizontal integration. Transition economies provide a unique research 
material, almost natural experiment, for testing industrial organization theories: at the 
start of the transition in Russia, individual plants were privatized as individual firms, and 
this was followed by the endogenous formation of conglomerates and multi-plant firms. 
In 1991 John Sutton created a theory of market structure formation. He divided industries 
into two types based on the opportunities for the firm strategic behaviour. Markets with 
homogeneous products are characterised by exogenous sunk costs, and sufficient 
expansion of the market size will bring concentration levels down. Markets with 
heterogeneous products have high advertising and R&D expenditures, i.e. endogenous 
sunk costs, and market size growth will not necessarily decrease the concentration levels. 
 
Despite the applicability of Sutton’s theory, the number of empirical studies devoted to its 
verification remains limited. Most of these works are focused on the specialized markets 
in developed economies and only a few studies have tested its validity in transition 
economies.  The forth chapter in this thesis aims to assess the validity of Sutton’s theory 
and address several related estimation problems.  
 
 Our results confirm Sutton’s theoretical predictions. Before the transition in 1991 both 
types of industries had a lower bound of market concentration negatively dependent on 
the market size. In 2003 however, only industries with exogenous sunk costs demonstrate 
this regularity. The lower bound of market concentration for industries with endogenous 
sunk costs is independent of the market size growth. 
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Chapter 2: Explaining the Control-Ownership Gap in 
Russian Companies 
2.1 Motivation 
 
Berle and Means (1932) pioneered the research on separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations and drew public attention to the resulting shortfalls in competences 
and responsibility that could affect company performance. They were the first to analyze 
the consequences of the fact that the ownership of many large American corporations is 
widely dispersed, while their control is concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
managers.  Their findings shaped the image of the modern firm for decades ahead and 
motivated extensive research on “managerial” problems, i.e. agency problems.  The 
works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983a, b)  are among the main 
body of research to examine the implications of the separation of decision and risk 
bearing functions.  
 
However, the relevance of the Berle-Means corporate model was questioned by empirical 
studies in the late 80s and 90s (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; etc.). 
In an article on the corporate ownership structures in 27 countries around the world, La 
Porta et al. (1999) showed that widely dispersed ownership is not that prevalent and a 
substantial number of large corporations have major controlling owners.  Their findings 
have switched the academic focus to the control leverage over cash-flow rights exercised 
by dominant stakeholders and on the expropriation of minority shareholders rights. 
 
The problem of control leverage by the main shareholder is different from the classic 
principal agent problem between managers and shareholders in several ways.  First, there 
is less external control by shareholders and a higher probability of entrenchment.  Second, 
major shareholders having ultimate control rights and a biased target function may take 
suboptimal economic decisions that do not maximize companies' value.  Third, in contrast 
with the owner-manager agency problem there is no clear consensus in the literature on 
the economic consequences of the control ownership gap leveraged by major 
stakeholders. 
 
Theory states that a high concentration of ownership is beneficial due to enhanced 
monitoring of management by the main stakeholder.  Nevertheless the separation of 
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control rights from cash-flow rights biases the incentives of decision makers and leads to 
suboptimal investment levels, excessive risk taking and looting.  Control leverage may be 
exercised by the largest stakeholder via three main mechanisms: pyramidal structures, 
double class shares and informal control channels. 
 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) specifically model the incentive mechanisms behind the 
formation of pyramidal schemes.  They postulate that an owner of a company, A, can 
artificially increase his level of control by increasing the number of intermediary 
companies B, given that the stake of each new company in the ownership chain is less 
than 100%.  Pyramiding remains the most widespread mechanism of separating control 
from cash-flow rights (La Porta, 1999).  Double-class shares are not widely employed 
many countries and are accounted for in several studies.  In practice, controlling 
stakeholders exploit additional methods such as affiliated management, appointment of 
board directors, control over debt arrears, control over distribution and supply networks, 
influence on investment inflows, ownership of brand names.  We will refer to the above 
practices as the second type of control enhancing mechanisms, in opposition to the first 
type, the more commonly used pyramidal effect.  It is worth mentioning that the non-
pyramidal control-ownership gap is largely ignored in the literature.  
 
In this chapter we estimate the total control ownership gap and decompose it into two 
components: pyramidal and informal control.  We apply this classification to a unique 
dataset containing both ownership data and expert assessments of the total control level.  
We assess the validity of the narrow control-ownership gap definition as a proxy of the 
total control ownership gap.  The results obtained are specific to Russian companies and 
caution should be exercised regarding their wider interpretation.  However, they provide a 
clear indication that this narrow definition can be misleading and that further research on 
measuring the full control-ownership leverage and re-assessing its effects is needed.  By 
measuring and decomposing the control ownership gap, this chapter also provides a 
starting base for explaining the causes and effects of ownership design in Russia.  
 
A detailed summary of theoretical research on the determinants of ownership structure 
can be found in Lim and Kim (2005).  Lim and Kim also describe agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control.  While the theory is conclusive on 
the negative impact of control ownership gap on the valuation of companies, empirical 
evidence is not. A large part of the empirical literature indeed finds that high ownership 
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concentration has a positive influence on the firm’s performance while large leverage of 
control over cash-flow rights has a negative influence (Claessens et al., 2002; Du, Dai, 
2005 among others).  In addition, a number of articles show that the separation of 
ownership and control has no impact on the valuation of companies (Carvalhal et al., 
2000; Ben-Amar, Andre, 2006; Holmen, Knopf, 2004). 
 
The majority of the literature on the control-ownership gap estimates control according to 
its narrow definition to measure the effects of pyramidal schemes (Claessens et al., 2002 ) 
and the use of non-voting shares (Ben-Amar, Andre, 2006; Holmen, Knopf, 2004). The 
lack of distinction between the two effects remains a major weakness of these studies and 
is partly due to the difficulty in measuring the control variable. The information on the 
total control gap, including informal mechanisms, would require estimates based on 
experts judgment and is normally not available. However, qualitative evidence based on 
case studies indicates that the total control ownership gap can significantly exceed its 
narrow definition.  For instance, in post-privatization Russia, controlling stakeholders 
often hold top management positions in the company.  The practice of taking the control 
of the company by acquiring its debt and threatening to bankrupt the enterprise was also 
widespread. The possibility that this selective evidence has wider confirmation has an 
important implication. It would mean that the narrowly defined control-ownership gap 
should pass the test of being an appropriate proxy variable for the total control-ownership 
gap. This includes two questions to be additionally studied. What is the importance of the 
informal control gap in the total control ownership ratio?  Does it have a distribution of 
white noise type, not correlated with some of the explanatory variables? 
 
This chapter aims at improving our understanding of the control ownership gap structure 
and the difficulties associated with its measurement. To that end a quantitative analysis of 
the control-ownership gap is applied to a large sample of Russian companies. In contrast 
to the ‘traditional’ ownership-control gap as defined by Berle and Means, where the gap 
is between numerous uninformed shareholders and powerful managers, and which has 
been thoroughly analyzed in the agency models, to the best of our knowledge no similar 
analysis has been performed so far on the control-ownership gap between the controlling 
stakeholder and minority shareholders.  
 
Empirical testing of the effects of ownership concentration and control leverage requires 
specific datasets that are not easily available. For this reason quantitative studies of the 
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ownership and control concentration are limited to a number of countries (East Asia, 
India, Chile, Sweden, Canada) for which the ownership datasets exist. Ownership, usually 
understood as cash-flow rights, can be directly quantified given that the individual stakes 
in the ownership chain are known. Quantifying the control variable, however, is more 
complex as the concept behind it is wider and not directly measurable. Besides, the 
information available is usually scarce.  
 
A high correlation between the total control effect and the pyramidal effect would justify 
the use of the latter in estimating the impact of full control ownership gap on the 
performance or valuation of companies. However, in the worst case scenario when 
informal control accounts for a large part of the total gap, and is weakly correlated with 
the pyramidal effect, and is not independent from the explanatory variables, the 
significance of the obtained estimations can be questioned. Standard assumptions for 
obtaining the unbiased and consistent estimators would be undermined by the presence of 
the measurement errors and endogeneity problem.  Consequently, studies of the countries 
where informal control plays a larger role than the pyramidal schemes and/or is not 
correlated with the latter, the use of the narrow control definition for estimating valuation 
effect could lead to the rejection of causality even if it exists for the total control-
ownership gap.  
 
Apart from the potential implications for the cross country research on control and 
performance interrelationship, this chapter contributes to a better understanding of the 
ownership and control architecture of the Russian corporate sector. The majority of the 
empirical studies on the corporate governance in Russia focus on the ownership 
concentration. While references to the existence and potential importance of control 
ownership gap are frequent in the literature (Guriev et al., 2005) there were no 
quantitative estimates for large samples.   
 
The standard corporate governance literature pays significant attention to the differences 
in the impact of various types of owners on company performance. State-owned 
companies usually are suspected of underperforming whereas foreign-owned firms are 
generally praised for their better corporate governance practices. In this chapter we look 
at the effect institutional types of owners have on the total control ownership gap as well 
as their preferences for the mechanism used to exercise it. We also include the size of 
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companies in our analysis, as some studies found it to have an impact on governance 
patterns and management efficiency.  
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2.2 Literature Review  
 
Economic analysis of the ownership structure of modern firms originates form Berle and 
Means (1932). For the first time they analyzed the impact of the separation between 
control and property rights in public corporations. The authors outlined that in companies 
with widely dispersed ownership structures, the key decisions on capital raising and profit 
redistribution are commonly delegated to management. This work inspired a large 
number of studies on the incentives and efficiency biases coming from the separation of 
control and ownership, which resulted in the comprehensive set of “agency problem” 
models developed in 1970s.  
 
Agency theory states that a higher ownership concentration can be beneficial for the 
performance of companies due to the improved incentives and possibilities for the main 
shareholder to monitor management. Bolton and Thadden (1998) model the trade-off 
between liquidity benefits of dispersed ownership versus improved management control 
provided by concentrated ownership. At the same time diversion of actual control level 
from the cash-flow claims can reverse this result. Bebchuk et al. (1999) warns that 
corporate structures with large control ownership gaps combine the incentive problems of 
both the dispersed ownership and controlled structures with a direct majority block-
holder. The distorted decision mechanism leads to suboptimal firm size and inefficient 
choice of projects. The model predicts positive effect of high ownership concentration. 
However, when the gap exceeds a certain limit the incentives for asset-stripping and cash 
flow extraction might outweigh the costs and risks associated with these activities. In 
addition, the control-ownership ratio influences the risk behaviour of the investors and a 
high enough gap might motivate them to exceed the optimal risk levels. The size of 
agency costs is sharply increasing in reverse relationship to the cash-flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder. The authors also argue that the related agency costs are higher 
than of highly leveraged firms. On the basis of this theory we expect the companies with 
a high control-ownership gap to have worse performance indicators than the companies 
with the same level of ownership concentration but smaller differences between control 
and ownership.  
 
The theory addressing the ownership structure of a single firm is conclusive that control-
ownership gap diminishes the value of a firm. However, this view may neglect an 
important aspect of the control-ownership leverage, namely that the underlining 
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incentives behind its formation is often the ownership of multiple companies by 
conglomerates. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) model this type of investors’ behavior 
and their use of the control-ownership gap as a mechanism for the creation of 
conglomerates and business groups. They argue that pyramidal schemes are often used by 
conglomerates in different countries to expand the assets under their control with the 
minimal capital costs.  Although using pyramidal structures biases the incentives and may 
lead to suboptimal investment and risk decisions by the controlling stakeholders, it can be 
compensated by the benefits associated with being part of the business group. There is a 
large amount of the related literature on business groups and their impact on company 
performance (literature review of these can be found in chapter 3).  While literature 
results are far from being conclusive in their current state, they provide the explanation 
that investors are sometimes willing to take the risks associated with pyramidal schemes 
in order to gain from business groups’ spillovers. An example of such spillovers could be 
lower cost bank credits available to business groups (Lim and Kim, 2005).   
 
While the theory rationalizes the negative impact of the control-ownership gap on the 
valuation and performance of companies it is important to acknowledge the existence of 
the factors, like benefits connected with the business group ownership that often are not 
accounted for by the standard models. That might or might not be the reason why the 
empirical results are less conclusive than the theoretical predictions regarding the 
performance effect of the control-ownership gap. Table 1 contains the list of major 
empirical works and a brief description of their results.  
 
A vast majority of the related literature focuses solely on studying the ownership 
concentration and   avoids issues related to the definition and measurement of the control 
level. These studies often implicitly assume the control variable to be binary and to equal 
100 % for the main stakeholder. In that respect the evidence on the impact of the 
ownership concentration on the performance of companies can be interpreted with the 
opposite sign for the effect control-ownership gap. If it is shown that a higher share of the 
cash-flow rights in the possession of the main stakeholder has a positive impact on 
performance, it can be inferred that control-ownership gap has a negative effect. 
 
The literature on the control-ownership structures is concentrated on a set of countries 
that traditionally have higher concentration of ownership in their economies, including 
East Asia countries like Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
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Taiwan, Thailand, other emerging economies like India, Chile and Brazil and few 
developed economies including Sweden and Canada.  
 
A large number of articles contain evidence that supports the notion of negative impacts 
from the control-ownership gap on companies’ valuations or positive impacts of 
ownership concentration on performance (Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens and Djankov,  
1999; Du, Dai, 2005; Lemmon, Lins, 2003; Villalonga, Amit, 2006).  Claessens et al., 
(2002) disentangled incentive and entrenchment effects of the concentrated ownership for 
companies in several East Asian countries and found an advantageous effect of cash-flow 
rights share and a negative impact of control leverage. The consequent study of the East 
Asian corporations Du and Dai (2005) found evidence that separation of control and 
ownership contributes to a risky capital structure. The authors also link it to corporate 
governance problems during the East Asian financial crisis.  
 
Large divergence between control level and cash-flow claims is usually associated with 
weak protection of minority shareholders and low-quality corporate governance.  
Additional research on business groups highlights their lower efficiency due to bad 
corporate governance and weak connection between firm performance and top 
management rotation (Campbell, Keys, 2002; Miwa, Ramseyer, 2003).  
 
Recently more evidence has become available on limited or nonexistent adverse link 
between company performance and control leverage over the cash flow rights. These 
studies can be divided into two groups based on the state of development of their 
economies and institutions: developed or emerging. 
 
 Ben-Amar, Andre (2006) shows that in Canada a large fraction of public companies have 
controlling shareholders (usually families), that exercise higher control than their voting 
rights. However, it does not result in a lower market valuation of these companies. The 
authors explain that a strong institutional framework prevents market participants from 
perceiving higher control leverage as a danger of value expropriation from minority 
shareholders. Similar results were obtained by Holmen and Knopf (2004) who analyzed 
impact of ownership structure on the valuation of Swedish companies. The authors 
explain the limited evidence of minority shareholder expropriation by the fact that 
Sweden’s extralegal institutions neutralize the risks coming from weak corporate 
governance.  However, Bozec and Lauren (2008) found that when the main stakeholders 
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in Canadian companies have both incentives and opportunities to expropriate minority 
shareholders their firms are subject to underperformance. 
 
A study of Brazilian companies, Carvalhal et al., (2000), revealed a large degree of 
concentration of the voting capital, and significant differences between voting and total 
capital held by the largest shareholders. It also concludes that pyramidal structures are 
widely used. No evidence was found to support any significant effect of the control 
ownership gap on the valuation of companies. In addition, research on the business 
groups that widely use pyramidal ownership structures revealed positive gains in the 
company performance (Luo and Chung, 2005; Khanna, Yafeh , 2007) 
 
Many studies on the control and ownership structure contain a large descriptive 
component due to the specificity of the analyzed data and the importance of data 
collection techniques for further analysis. Information on ownership structures is not 
easily available and the majority of researchers face the necessity of compiling their own 
datasets. A description of ownership architectures in different countries is usually very 
enlightening, however many of these studies would benefit from more substantial 
analytical components. There are few studies aimed at explaining the formation of 
ownership and control levels (Bebchuk, 1999; Grosfeld, Hashi, 2007). The lack of 
literature investigating the factors defining levels of control and ownership in companies 
is substantial. Furthermore, the main factors that contribute to higher control-ownership 
leverage largely remain to be identified. 
 
While there might be multiple reasons for the differences in the empirical findings on the 
control ownership gap we would like to draw the attention to the one resulting from the 
inappropriate treatment of the endogeneity problem and measurement error in the control 
variable. From the theoretical perspective, control is defined by the ability to make key 
decisions in the company management. Thus control level can not be measured as precise 
as ownership share and might be better approximated by using expert opinions on the 
decision making processes in the company.  
 
As mentioned above there are three methods by which main stakeholder can enhance the 
control level over the cash-flow rights: dual-class shares, pyramidal structures and other 
less easily observable mechanisms. Most of the literature uses low boundary for the 
control measure: pyramidal effect in some cases supplemented by accounting for non-
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voting shares. Dual class shares are not widely used in the world, with the exceptions of 
Canada and South Africa (Bebchuk, 1999) and thus their omission is often practical. 
Crossholding of shares between groups of companies provides an additional mechanism 
of control enhancement. However, it is the least transparent and most difficult to estimate.  
 
Empirical evidence regarding the control-ownership gap impact is useful from the point 
of view of the public policy response. However, among the studies that conclude on the 
insignificant role of the control-ownership gap, it is necessary to identify whether the 
results are caused by measurement errors or by offsetting efficiencies that outweigh the 
negative impact predicted by agency theory. In this regard, identification of the 
measurement error biases in estimating control-ownership gap impact on the companies’ 
valuation and performance is important.  
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Table 1: Literature overview on control ownership gap 
 
Article Countries Ownership structures description Methods to enhance 
control 
Economic consequences 
La Porta et al., (1999)     
Claessens et al., (2000) East Asia1 Larger gap in family-owned and small 
companies, except Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan. No dispersion of ownership 
over time 
Pyramids and cross-
holding 
Wealth concentration and barrier to future policy 
reform 
Claessens et al., (2002) East Asia1   Negative impact on firm value due to entrenchment 
effect. Higher cash-flow rights positive effect via 
incentive effect 
Claessens, Djankov 
(1999) 
Czech Republic Study of ownership concentration  Positive impact on profitability and labor 
productivity 
Du, Dai (2005) East Asia1 Data from Claessens et al., (2002)  Higher market leverage, higher risks and corporate 
value losses 
Lemmon, Lins (2003) East Asia1 Large separation between cash-flow 
rights and control rights 
Pyramidal structures Underperformance of stock for firms with high 
control leverage during the crisis, not before 
Lim and Kim (2005) South Korea Conglomerates with high family 
control (chaebols) 
Pyramidal and 
nonvoting schemes 
Government support and low cost bank borrowing 
contribute to chaebols growth and compensate 
minor investors. Higher ownership concentration in 
narrowly focused chaebols. Inverse relationship 
between control and debt leverage. 
Carvalhal et al., (2000) Brazil A large degree of concentration of the 
voting capital, and reasonable 
difference between voting and total 
capital held by the largest shareholders 
Pyramid structures 
are not most 
important, non-voting 
shares are 
No effect on valuation 
Ben-Amar, Andre 
(2006) 
Canada Large share of public companies have 
controlling shareholders (families) that 
exercise control over voting rights 
while holding small fraction of cash-
Dual class voting 
shares and stock 
pyramids 
No negative impact on company performance 
                                                 
1 Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
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flow rights 
Holmen, Knopf (2004) Sweden High degree of separation of 
ownership from control  
Pyramids, dual-class 
shares, cross-holdings
Limited evidence of shareholders expropriation 
Demirag, Serter (2003) Turkey Ownership is highly concentrated  with 
families being the dominant 
shareholders 
Pyramids, business 
groups presence 
 
Arslan, Karan (2006) Turkey   Effect on debt structures (maturities of the 
company) 
Faccio, Lang. (2002) Western2 
Europe 
Widely held and family controlled 
firms dominate 
Use of multiple class 
voting shares and 
pyramids is marginal 
 
Thomsen, Pedersen, 
(2000) 
Western 
Europe3 
  Positive effect of ownership concentration on 
shareholder value, which disappears at high levels 
of concentration 
Grosfeld, Hashi  (2007) Poland, Czech 
Republic 
Increased concentration of ownership  In the Czech Republic, the increase in ownership 
concentration is less likely in poorly performing 
firms, while in Poland the quality of past 
performance does not affect investors’ willingness 
to increase their holdings 
Villalonga, Amit 
(2006) 
US Study of the family owned firms Multiple share 
classes, pyramids, 
cross-holdings, or 
voting agreements 
Family control in excess of ownership reduces 
shareholder value 
                                                 
2 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK 
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden 
2.3 Data and Variables Description 
 
A unique database of the largest Russian companies was assembled by the World Bank for its 
country economic memorandum report in 2003. This database contains detailed information on 
the ownership and control of the largest Russian enterprises. Researchers collected information 
from a wide variety of sources such as commercially available databases and websites, 
interviews with financial analysts and industry experts. The detailed description of the survey 
methodology can be found in the World Bank Report “From Transition to Development” (2004).  
This database enabled us to trace ownership and control links between the companies, and 
calculate the cumulative ownership stakes and control-ownership gaps of ultimate stakeholders.  
 
The survey was constructed with the aim of identifying the final controlling owners of the 
companies in the sample. For each firm of the sample researchers identified up to three largest 
owners with the corresponding ownership stakes and level of control. Consequently, the 
ownership and control structure of the first level owners is sought. The control chain is unwound 
until the final controller is defined. The ownership chain also goes downward, so that all the 
subsidiaries of the surveyed firms are also included in the database. Final controllers were 
classified into five institutional types: foreign companies, federal government, regional 
government, large private domestic owners and other private domestic owners. The last two 
categories may be individuals or groups of individuals, united together into alliances if they 
appear as ultimate owners of the same companies. The controlling ultimate owner is determined 
using standard definition in literature (La Porta et al., 1999) by tracing the chain of ownership to 
find who has the most voting rights. 
 
The first stage of the selection process consisted in selecting the largest companies in terms of 
sales and employment in the main (also determined by size) sectors based on census data. The 
second stage included adding the identified subsidiaries of these firms. The original sample 
contained only large Russian legal entities, whereas the final database also includes the 
subsidiaries of surveyed companies. 
 
 Both domestic and foreign owners, individuals and legal entities are present in the current 
database. The current database contains 2596 entries: 1335 Russian firms with okpo (official 
identification statistical codes), 42 banks, 610 individuals or groups of individuals, 25 regional 
governments, 32 federal ministries, 418 intermediaries, 102 foreign companies. In total 45 
sectors covered by the database constitute 40% of the total economy by employment and 76.5 % 
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of industry by sales. The surveyed companies operate in 70 out of 83 regions and account for 
75% of industry sales, 33.7% of industry employment, 30% of employment in services and 
68.3% of the total bank assets. Table 1 of the Appendix describes the sample representation and 
contains descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
 
Given the problems of corporate governance in Russia, the survey participants suggested 
differentiating between the degree of ownership and control. As a consequence, the survey 
contained two separate questions on ownership stake and control level. While ownership stake is 
a precise variable, the level of control reflects expert opinion on the ability of the stakeholder to 
influence key decisions of the company. Part of the additional control comes from affiliated 
management, part comes from multiple or unregistered shareholdings4. 
 
Researchers realized there was a need to distinguish two types of domestic owners because of the 
existence of integrated business groups that control large shares of the economy and/or dominate 
particular sectors of the Russian economy. By aggregating sales and employment under the 
control of each ultimate owner, it is possible to calculate his share within the industry or region 
of operation, as well as in the economy as a whole. Moreover a large sample cover of the survey 
allows calculating the concentration of ownership inside markets and across the economy.  
Ownership concentration results across the economy were analyzed by Guriev and Rachinsky 
(2005). In this chapter we focus on the concentration of ownership and control within the 
companies.  
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2.4 Decomposition of Control-Ownership Gap: Methodology  
 
There are several methods of gaining greater control level than is implied the actual share of 
cash-flow rights. They include use of pyramidal structures, non-voting shares, and other less well 
observable mechanisms including concealed crossholding and affiliated management. The 
majority of the literature concentrates on measuring control ownership gap created by the use of 
pyramidal ownership chains. Some researchers also account for the use of multiple voting class 
shares. The last method, to the best of our knowledge, has never been accounted for in the 
empirical studies of substantial samples of companies due to its nontransparent nature. The 
design of the control variable in our dataset, which encompasses a wider definition of control, 
allows us to measure the full control ownership gap. The structure of the database also allows us 
to trace the ultimate owner at the top of the pyramid and to measure his cash flow rights in the 
companies at the source of the ownership chain. Using this information we are able to single out 
the pyramidal effect from the total control-ownership gap. The database does not contain 
information on the multiple classes of shares. This limitation should have a neglectable impact 
on the results due to the very limited use of these types of shares in Russia in 2003 (Guriev et al., 
2005).  
 
The second part of the total control-ownership gap, exercised via less visible control methods is 
not measured in the literature due to data availability constraints. Often, the implicit assumption 
is that the control ownership gap equals its pyramid component. Measuring the hidden part of the 
iceberg for a sample of Russian companies might serve as a useful benchmark for the studies on 
control-ownership gap in other countries, as well as providing results about Russian companies 
that are of interest in their own right.  
 
In measuring the control level we follow Claessens et al. (2000). Claessens’ definition of  control 
relies on voting rights and uses of deviations from one-share}one-vote, pyramiding schemes, and 
cross-holdings as means of separating cash-flow and voting rights. Suppose a entrepreneur owns 
10% of the shares in firm A, which in turn has 20% of the shares in firm B. If there are no 
deviations from one-share one-vote, it could be said that the entrepreneur owns 2% of the cash-
flow rights of firm B. At the same time exercising one’s voting rights can be described as the 
ability to influence a binary variable, therefore control rights transmitted along the chain of 
companies, could be better measured as the minimum voting stake. In the above example we 
could say that entrepreneur controls 10% of firm B, or the weakest link in the chain of voting 
rights.  
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In order to measure the total control of the ultimate stakeholder, we apply the method of the 
weakest link in the ownership chain to our control variable. We then apply the same method to 
the ownership variable in order to calculate part of the total control that comes exclusively from 
the use of pyramids. Using the standard definition of the cash-flow rights, we calculate the 
ultimate ownership share as the product of the ownership stakes along the chain. By applying 
Claessens’ method both to control and ownership variables and comparing the ultimate result we 
make a novel extension to the existing methodology. Subsequently, we introduce the 
decomposition technique to separate the factors contributing to control-ownership gap formation 
.   
 
If i  is an ownership share of the firm Xi in a firm Xi+1 in the ownership chain leading to the 
ultimate owner Y, then chain ownership share or cash-flow rights of Y equals to 
i
i . The 
ultimate owner Y is said to have a pyramidal ownership of },.min{ 1 k , the weakest link in the 
chain of ownership shares. This is the first component of the total control.  
 
If i  is a control level of a firm of the firm Xi a firm i +1 , then chain control equals to 
i
i , 
then the pyramidal control exercised by the ultimate owner Y could be calculated as 
},.min{ 1 k .  The control level i  is based on an expert opinion on the ability of the 
stakeholder to influence key decisions of the company4.  
 
Claessens et al. (2000) calculate the control ownership gap as the ratio of the pyramidal 
ownership share to the chain ownership share 
i
i
k

 },.min{ 1 . The more this ratio exceeds the 
unity the greater is the control exercised via the use of pyramids. This gives us the pure effect of 
using pyramiding schemes. For reasons of convenience we will refer to it as the pyramid effect 
and use the notation  (lambda).   
 
We calculate the total control ownership gap as the difference between the ultimate control 
exercised by the final owner , pyramidal control, and his cash-flow rights, chain ownership share 
                                                 
4 While not constrained in their estimates by the questionnaire, experts tended to measure control level 
with in bins of  5 percentage points, e.g. i  will only take values of 5%, 10%, 15%, etc. . The 
measurement error from this rounding should not have a big effect on our estimations.  
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
i
i
k

 },.min{ 1 . The total control ownership gap can be decomposed in two components: 
pyramid effect and a ratio of pyramidal control level to pyramidal ownership. For convenience 
reason we will refer to it as control variable effect and use notation K (kappa). 
},.min{
},.min{
1
1
k
k

 .  The equation for the decomposition is presented below.  
 
 
i
i
k
k
k
i
i
k





 },.min{
},.min{
},.min{},.min{ 1
1
11        (1) 
 
By taking the logarithms of these ratios we transform the decomposition to its linear form and 
use small Greek letters for notation purposes. This identity is referred to in further estimations of 
the control-ownership gap decomposition.   
 
 ;lnlnln
 
In order to better illustrate our decomposition method we consider here the example of the Volga 
Motors company, taken from the World Bank database. This company, producing engines for 
minivans and boats, has one major controlling owner Ruspromauto-Nizhegorod Cars that owns 
65% of the company but controls 80%. Ruspromauto-Nizhegorod Cars is entirely owned by 
Ruspromauto. Ruspromauto has three major owners, Basic Element (37.5%, 70%), Millhouse 
Capital (37.5%, 30%) and an individual stakeholder Strezhnev Dmitry (13%, 0%). The 
corresponding ownership and control shares are respectively indicated in brackets. The excess 
control exercised by Basic Element is explained by the affiliated management of Ruspromauto. 
Basic Element is part of the business group owned by Oleg Deripaska, one of the most 
influential Russian oligarchs. His ultimate ownership share in Volga Motors is 24.375% 
(65%*100%*37.5%) whereas his pyramidal ownership is 37.5% (min{65%,100%,37.5%}) and 
his pyramidal control is 70% (min{80%,100%,70%,100%}). In this case the total control 
ownership gap Γ is therefore 2.87 (70%/24.375%), and is the result of two effects: the control 
effect Κ which amounts to 1.87 (70%/37.5%) and the pyramidal effect Λ which equals 1.54 
(37.5%/24.375%).  
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2.5 Ownership Concentration of the Russian Companies 
Similarly to companies in other post transition countries, Russian firms have a highly 
concentrated ownership structure. In half of the companies the main owner has a direct stake of 
more than 54% and almost a third of all companies have only one owner. The level of ownership 
concentration at the firm level is slightly higher than in Czech and Polish companies. Grosfeld 
and Hashi (2007) found that the average share of the largest stakeholder in Czech companies was 
51.9% in 1999 and 50.3% in Polish companies in 2000. Given the complex corporate structures 
that have evolved since the privatization era, the distribution of the direct ownership stakes is not 
very helpful in understanding the underlying ownership relationships.  
 
In order to identify the ultimate owners we repeat the procedure applied by Guriev and 
Rachinsky (2005). For each company we choose the owner that has the largest stake and add him 
to the linear ownership chain that leads from each firm to its ultimate owner. Table 2 describes 
the average complexity of the ownership chains in Russian companies. Around a quarter of all 
companies are directly owned by their ultimate controllers, half of the companies have one 
intermediary owner, and another quarter has three or more companies in the ownership chain.  
 
Table 2: Length of the ownership chain in pyramidal schemes 
Number of links Number of companies
5 27 
4 69 
3 265 
2 642 
1 368 
mean 2.09 
 
In the example of the Volga Motors company described in the previous section, Oleg Deripaska 
was identified as an ultimate owner of Volga motors via the linear chain of major owners 
Ruspromauto-Nizhnegorod Cars- Ruspromauto - Basic Element. Hence the ownership chain for 
Volga Motors equals 4. Another example from the database is Petmol, a milk plant in St. 
Petersburg that is controlled by Group Planet Management at 65%, while the company’s 
ownership stake in the milk plant is only 25%. In this case the control leverage is exercised via 
control over debt arrears. Group Planet Management is 100% owned by Millhouse Capital, 
which belongs to Roman Abramovich with 90% ownership and control. 
 
We use the ownership stakes of all companies in the linear ownership chain of main controllers 
to calculate the chain ownership or cash-flow rights of the final owner. Figure 1 shows the 
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difference in the distribution of direct ownership stakes and cash-flow rights of the major 
stakeholder after accounting for the pyramidal leverage.  
 
Figure 1: Cash-flow rights of main stakeholder 
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After accounting for the use of pyramidal schemes, the number of companies with a single 
ultimate owner is substantially reduced to 142 (10% of total) and the median stake of the 
ultimate owner comes down to 36%. According to Bebchuk (1999) larger cash-flow rights of the 
controlling stakeholder imply smaller agency costs imposed by the separation of ownership and 
control. 
 
Theory predicts that ownership concentration will decline with the size of the company partially 
due to the limited capital access. This is supported by evidence on the East Asian corporations 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Figure 2 shows additional distribution of the ultimate ownership stakes 
of the main controllers weighted by the size of the company. The logarithm of companies’ sales 
in 2003 is used as a measurement of company size. Compared to unweighted distribution it 
reveals whether ownership is more concentrated in larger companies as weighting ownership 
stake observations by the size of the company increases the relative significance of bigger 
companies. Wider left tail of the weighted distribution indicates that larger companies have 
relatively smaller ownership concentration. The sharp fall of the density bar for the 100% 
ownership stake points out that only relatively smaller companies have a single ultimate owner. 
This preliminary data investigation shows supporting evidence for the intuitive theory prediction.  
 
Figure 2: Cash-flow rights of main stakeholder weighted by size of the company 
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Literature devoted to studying the determinants of the control ownership gap indicates 
institutional type of the ultimate owner as a significant factor. Table 3 contains summary 
statistics of the ownership concentration of different institutional types of owners. It reveals 
significant differences in the ownership pattern. Business groups have the lowest cash-flow 
claims on the companies they control with a median stake share of 30 %, as opposed to 36% for 
other individual owners. It is worth noting that the federal government has similar pattern to the 
other private owners with a slightly lower median stake of 35%, while regional governments 
hold substantially higher ultimate ownership rights with a median stake of 51%.  Foreign owners 
hold the highest share of 87% of the cash-flow rights in the companies they control among all 
other types of owners. We can also note that within all groups there is a substantial degree of 
variability in the ownership concentration.  
 
Table 3: Ownership stake of the main stakeholder by institutional type 
Owner type  Min Mean Median Max 
Links, 
average  N 
Business groups 0.78 36.70 30.12 100 2.07 377
Foreigners 12.45 74.32 87.00 100 1.41 107
Federal 
government 6.13 42.17 35.00 100 1.76 167
Regional 
government 1.40 57.33 50.75 100 1.42 88
Other private 0.56 40.17 35.70 100 1.52 628
Total 0.56 43.23 36.12 100 1.74 1367
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2.6 A Cross-Country Comparison of the Control Ownership Gap 
 
Cross–country studies of the control-ownership gap face the problem of sample heterogeneity, 
which is exaggerated by the existing differences in the corporate law systems. This poses 
significant constraints on the interpretations and policy implications of cross-country 
comparisons of the control and ownership structures. Nevertheless this analysis is necessary and 
can be very useful proved the results are interpreted with due caution. Given the data limitations 
and sample heterogeneity we limit our analysis to the comparison of the descriptive statistics 
published in studies for other emerging and developed economies. 
 
In previous section we calculated that the median stake of the ultimate owner comes down to 
36%. Ultimate owners in Thailand hold the highest median ownership stake with 30%, compared 
with 24% and 20% in Indonesia and Singapore respectively. Japanese controlling owners have 
the smallest cash-flow rights in their companies, the average pyramidal stake is 9.6% and median 
is 4% (Claessens et al., 2000). Ownership concentration in the Russian companies is high by 
international standards. 
 
To compare Russia to East Asian countries in terms of the control-ownership gap we have 
calculated the matching indicator from our database. Claessens et al. (2000) accounted for cross-
holdings but admitted the limited information availability available relative to other ways of 
corporate leverage. For our sample of the largest Russian companies we report both the total 
control ownership gap and the pyramidal effect. In order to ease the comparison we use the 
inverted ratios },.min{
1
1 k
i
i


  and },.min{
1
1 k
i
i


  in absolute terms. 
 
 
Figure 3: Separation of control and ownership in East Asia countries and Russia 
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We calculate the control-ownership gap based on the ownership numbers and the knowledge of 
the pyramidal ownership chains. Comparing the average size of the control-ownership gap in 
different countries, Russia appears to be positioned in the middle of the East Asian countries, 
between Singapore and Taiwan. However, if we take into account other sources of corporate 
leverage Russia then moves towards the countries with the highest control-ownership gap ratio, 
close to Japan. This comparison is probably correct for Japan, but not for other East Asian 
countries. Due to the lack of information on the total control- ownership gap in other countries, it 
would still be correct to compare the control ownership gap in Russia with that of other countries 
based solely on its pyramidal effect of control leveraging. 
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2.7 Control-Ownership Gap in Russian Companies 
 
Following the methodology described in the section 2.3 we calculate the total control-ownership 
gap and its pyramidal (λ) and control variable (κ) components for the sample of the largest 
Russian companies (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Decomposition of control-ownership gap 
 Control Ownership Gap 
Stats 
N=1367 
Pyramidal effect 
λ 
Control effect 
κ 
Total gap 
γ 
Mean 
(sd) 
0.28 
(0.40)
0.40 
(0.58) 
0.68 
(0.74)
Share in total gap 0.41 0.59 1.00
N of companies with one effect 438 202 1098
Share of companies with gap>0 0.48 0.66  0.80
 
The vast majority of companies in our database (80%) have a main owner who exercises control 
rights exceeding his cash-flow rights. 48% of all companies have control ownership gap that 
comes from the creation of the pyramidal ownership structures, while in 66% of companies it is 
exercised via other control enhancing mechanisms. Out of the 1098 companies with a control-
ownership gap, 32% have a control gap exclusively coming from the control variable effect κ, 
whereas only 15% of companies exclusively exercise it via pyramidal schemes λ, and 33% of 
them use both mechanisms.  
 
In terms of the magnitude of the control-ownership gap, control variable effect κ is responsible 
for 59% of the total control-ownership gap, while pyramidal effect λ contributes to the remaining 
41%. On average, the control level is exceeding ownership rights by 32 % (e0.28-1) due to the 
pyramid effect λ and by 49% (e0.4-1) due to the control variable effect κ.  
 
These findings highlight the large role of the informal mechanisms in the control ownership 
leveraging. They also indicate that there are substantial differences in the structure of the two 
components of the control-ownership gap. In order to understand whether the pyramidal effect 
can be used as a proxy variable for the total control-ownership gap we need to look at the 
correlation between the two components and ultimately between pyramidal effect and total 
control-ownership gap. For this purpose we use the frequency tables of these variables for the 
reason of their semi-binary structure.  
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Table 5: Frequency table for the pyramidal and control variable effects 
Pyramidal effect  (λ) 
Control variable effect (κ) 
λ=0  
(no gap) 
λ>0 
(non-zero gap) Total 
κ=0 (no gap) 269 202 471
κ>0 (some gap) 438 458 896
Total 707 660 1367
 
Table 5 shows the number of companies in the four groups: with no control-ownership gap, with 
pyramidal effect only, with control variable effect only and with both pyramidal and control 
variable effect. Out of 896 companies that have control variable effect κ only half (48.9 %) 
would be identified with the use of pyramidal effect variable λ. Concurrently, out of 471 
companies that do not have control variable effect, 202 (42.9 %) have the control leverage 
coming via the pyramidal ownership structures. These numbers demonstrate that correlation 
between the pyramidal and control variable effect is not very strong.  
 
Table 6: Frequency table for pyramidal and total control effects 
Pyramidal effect (λ) 
Total control effect (γ) 
λ =0 
(no gap) 
λ >0 
(non-zero gap) total 
γ =0 (no gap) 269 0 269
γ >0 (some gap) 438 660 1098
Total 707 660 1367
 
Table 6 separates companies into three groups: companies having no control-ownership gap, 
companies with a pyramidal separation of the control, and those where all control leverage is 
exercised via alternative mechanisms. By relying solely on the pyramidal effect we can identify 
660 out of 1098 companies whose final owners have control level exceeding their cash-flow 
rights. The correlation between the size of total control-ownership gap and pyramidal gap equals 
0.63.  
 
Relying solely on the pyramidal structure information would result in a substantial 
underestimation of the number of companies that have a control-ownership gap. This means that 
regression results that use the pyramidal effect as an explanatory variable can not be interpreted 
as an effect of the total control leverage, due to the fact that a large share of the companies 
exercising control leverage is part of the no-gap benchmark group. Assuming that non-pyramidal 
control leverage mechanisms indeed exist in other emerging markets, we conclude that the 
previously mentioned empirical studies are subject to this problem. Among the two components 
control variable effect κ represents a better alternative due to the fact that it accounts for a larger 
proportion of the total control-ownership gap. 
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The low correlation between the pyramidal and the total effect would be less troubling if the 
control variable effect had a distribution independent of the other explanatory variables. We 
study this question by looking at the relationship between some of the common explanatory 
variables in the performance and valuation equations and the control ownership gap components.  
 
The institutional type of the controller is considered by the literature as an important factor that 
can influence company performance. Table 7 contains median values of the control-ownership 
gap decomposed by the mechanism of control leverage and by the type of owner.  
 
Table 7: Decomposition of control-ownership gap by the type of owner 
 Control Ownership Gap 
 
Pyramidal effect 
 Control effect 
Total gap 
γ 
Business groups 
(sd) 
0.37 
(0.40)
0.57 
(0.65)
0.93 
(0.79) 
Foreigners 
(sd) 
0.06 
(0.17)
0.12 
(0.28)
0.19 
(0.35) 
Federal government 
(sd) 
0.38 
(0.46)
0.15 
(0.27)
0.53 
(0.49) 
Regional government 
(sd) 
0.18 
(0.32)
0.26 
(0.60)
0.43 
(0.78) 
Other private 
(sd) 
0.25 
(0.40)
0.44 
(0.60)
0.69 
(0.76) 
Total 
0.28 
(0.40)
0.40 
(0.58)
0.68 
(0.74) 
  Note: if γ=0 there is no control-ownership gap 
 
A decomposition of the control ownership gap according to the type of owner reveals a 
nonhomogeneous pattern. Business groups have the highest corporate leverage on their 
ownership stakes: they control 2.5 (e0.93) times more than the ultimate share of cash-flow rights 
in their possession. The largest part of the leverage (60%) is exercised via nonpyramidal control 
channels while pyramidal structures also play a significant role and help to exercise the 
remaining 40% of the gap.  
 
The smallest gap between the control level and the cash-flow rights is found in the foreign 
owned companies and constitutes only 20 % on average. However, the relative significance of 
informal control is similar to that of business groups and equals 63%.  
 
In this respect, federal government represents a different type of ultimate controller. Almost 70% 
of the control-ownership gap in federal government owned companies come from the pyramidal 
structures. That is much higher than the Russian economy average of 40%. Regional 
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government, however, demonstrates a control leverage pattern that is different from the federal 
government and is to that of business groups. Anecdotal evidence on regional government 
policies supports the similarity between some regional authorities and business groups. Both 
federal and regional government companies have a smaller control ownership gap than the other 
privately owned firms. Smaller private principle owners have a control level that is on average 
two times higher than their cash-flow rights.  
 
Table 8 shows the percentage of companies with a control ownership gap, classified by the 
mechanism of control enhancement and the type of owner. This additional breakdown of the 
control-ownership gap as a binary variable gives another perspective on the differences in the 
use of the control leverage mechanisms by the different types of owners. 72% of business groups 
and 71% of other private owners use other non-pyramidal control mechanisms. Interestingly, 
federal government use other control mechanisms more often than the regional government but 
with a smaller leverage.  
 
Table 8: Number of companies by the sources of control ownership gap and the type of owner 
 Share of Companies with Control Ownership Gap 
   from pyramidal effect (if λ>0) from control effect (κ>0) total  (λ>0) Number  of companies
Business groups 0.67 0.72 0.92 377
Foreigners 0.22 0.44 0.51 107
Federal government 0.58 0.54 0.76 167
Regional government 0.33 0.48 0.56 88
Other private 0.41 0.71 0.82 628
Total 0.48 0.66 0.80 1367
 
The above analysis indicates that regressions including the pyramidal effect λ as proxy of the 
total control ownership gap γ can be biased due to the endogeneity problem. The error term in 
this case will include the second component of the total control-ownership gap κ. If this 
unaccounted component of the gap is correlated with any of the explanatory variables in the 
equation their resulting coefficients will be biased. We investigate this question by using 
regression analysis in order to identify whether standard explanatory variables in the 
performance equations are correlated with the existence and the size of the control-ownership 
gap. We estimate separate regressions for the total control ownership gap and its two 
components. 
 
As most of the literature treats the control ownership gap as an independent exogenous variable, 
there is a lack of sufficient reference material for such analysis. Some studies refer to the 
 30
differences in the institutional and regulatory structures of different countries as an explanation 
of the control-ownership gap. The factors that influence differences in size of the control-
ownership gap between the companies are rarely studied. Here we do not intend to explain the 
variation in control-ownership gap; our aim is to test whether the control-ownership gap is 
correlated with some of the commonly used explanatory variables.  
 
Valuation and performance models often include together with the ownership concentration or 
control ownership gap the size of firms, their labour productivity and capital intensity, as well as 
the institutional type of the owner. We include these parameters in the regressions explaining the 
total control-ownership gap, the pyramidal effect and the control variable effect. We do not use 
stock market indicators, also standard in this type of models, as only a small number of 
companies in our sample are trading on the stock exchange. At first, we treat the control-
ownership gap as a binary variable and use the probit estimation procedure. Then, we use the 
tobit procedure to account for the size of the gap. The following equation specification is similar 
to the one used by Grosfeld, Hashi (2007) in estimating factors that determine the ownership 
concentration in Polish companies.  
 
Table 9: Determinants of the control-ownership gap existence (probit estimation) 
 
Pyramidal effect 
 y=1 if 0  
Control effect 
y=1 if 0  
Total 
y=1 if 0  
Business groups 0.617** 0.281 0.797**
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.213)
Foreigners -0.979** -0.560** -1.088**
 (0.269) (0.217) (0.248)
Federal government 0.221 -0.795** -0.550*
 (0.215) (0.210) (0.240)
Regional government -0.115 -0.273 -0.695**
 (0.217) (0.212) (0.246)
Size (log sales) -0.202** -0.078 -0.168**
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.059)
Capital/Sales -0.055 0.012 0.009
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.056)
Sales/Labor 0.052 -0.026 0.083
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.086)
Industry dummies + + +
   Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 9 contains the results of the estimated probability of having a control ownership gap for 
different control leverage mechanisms. The regressions also contain industry specific dummy 
variables, which are not reported. Including additional explanatory variables allows us to identify 
more clearly the relationship between the gap and the owner type. For example, business group 
companies are larger on average than other privately owned firms. It might be that the higher 
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control-ownership gap for business groups, shown above, results from the difference in the size 
distributions of samples or that there is some industry specific ownership patterns. However, 
after accounting for additional explanatory variables our main conclusions regarding the total 
control-ownership gap remains the same: i.e. companies that are part of a business group are 
exposed to the highest control leverage. For state owned and even more so for foreign owned 
companies, control exceeds the cash flow rights to a lesser extent than for other private 
companies. The size of the firm has a negative impact on the existence of a control-ownership 
gap. This confirms the conclusions of Claessens (2003). Capital intensity and productivity do not 
show any significant impact on any of the control effects. Marginal effects estimations are 
presented in Table 9b in Appendix. 
 
Regarding different components of the control ownership gap, the probability of having a control 
variable effect is negatively correlated with being owned by a foreign company or a federal 
government. Business groups have significantly higher pyramidal effect which is in agreement 
with our expectations.  
 
The majority of companies in our sample have a control-ownership gap and there is a large 
variation in its size starting from 20% (e0.19-1) average leverage in foreign-owned companies to 
150% (e0.93-1) for business group owned firms. In order to estimate the parameters that are 
related to the size of the gap, we use two stage estimation (tobit method), which is designed for 
variables that have censored distributions (Table 10). The censored part in our case consists of 
the companies that do not have any control ownership gap.  
 
Table 10: Determinants of the control-ownership gap size (tobit estimation) 
 
Pyramidal effect 
  Control effect   
Total   
Business groups 0.172** 0.157* 0.218**
 (0.056) (0.073) (0.073)
Foreigners -0.600** -0.542** -0.818**
 (0.122) (0.128) (0.129)
Federal government 0.091 -0.677** -0.423**
 (0.091) (0.125) (0.117)
Regional government -0.207* -0.211 -0.382**
 (0.099) (0.124) (0.123)
Size (log sales) -0.086** -0.023 -0.069**
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023)
Capital/Sales -0.010 -0.013 -0.016
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
Sales/Labor 0.025 -0.020 -0.002
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.035)
Obs uncensored  479 585 723
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Results from the Tobit estimations are qualitatively similar to the probit estimation output. 
However, large changes in the relative magnitudes of the coefficients for different ownership 
types suggest that the restrictions imposed by the Tobit procedure are influencing the results.  
While the Tobit procedure accounts for the selection bias by estimating the probability of having 
a control-ownership gap, it uses the same set of regressors for the probability of having a control 
ownership gap and for estimating its absolute size. This imposes strong constraints on the 
corresponding coefficients. To avoid this complication we use Heckman model which allows for 
different regressors  in the selection and principal equation.  
 
Table 11: Determinants of the control-ownership gap size (Heckman model) 
 Pyramidal effect (λ) Control effect ( ) Total(γ) 
 Size Select Size Select  Size Select
Business groups -0.015 0.076* 0.128* 0.018 0.168* 0.063
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.061) (0.041) (0.067) (0.095)
Foreigners -0.298** -0.108** -0.385** -0.017 -0.515** -0.018
 (0.072) (0.035) (0.079) (0.049) (0.077) (0.061)
Federal 
government 
0.027 0.040 -0.364** -0.008 -0.135* 0.018
 (0.057) (0.042) (0.064) (0.040) (0.061) (0.063)
Regional 
government 
-0.039 -0.029 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.006
 (0.069) (0.038) (0.094) (0.048) (0.103) (0.063)
Size (log sales) -0.014 0.000 0.010 0.001 -0.017 0.002
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019)
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, industry dummies are included 
but not reported, number of observations is 852. 
 
Results from the Heckman model estimation confirm two previously identified trends: foreign 
owned companies are less likely to have control ownership gap and if they have a pyramidal or 
control effect gap it is of significantly smaller magnitude. Business group companies are not 
more likely to have a control variable effect. However, when they do have a control variable 
effect, they are likely to exercise higher control leverage.  At the same time the firms owned by 
federal government have control effect gap of significantly lower magnitude.  
 
Both pyramidal and control variable effects significantly differ by the type of owner, however 
this difference does not have the same structure. These results support the previous argument that 
using pyramid effect as a proxy variable might lead to biased estimations of the control-
ownership effect.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
  
The empirical evidence on the role and influence of the control-ownership gap on company 
performance is mixed. One possible explanation might be the existing problems in measuring the 
total control gap. The largest stakeholders can use several methods to enhance their control over 
cash-flow rights, however only few of them are usually accounted for in the literature. The 
missing part of the control-ownership gap variable may be one reason for the incorrect 
estimations.  
 
This chapter analyses the structure of the control ownership gap in a large set of Russian 
companies. We decompose the total gap into two components: control over cash-flow leverage 
coming from pyramidal structures and control gap exercised via the use of less formal 
mechanisms, e.g. affiliated management, ability to influence board of directors. The pyramidal 
effect is usually accounted for in the literature, whereas the second control variable effect is 
normally omitted. 
 
There is a significant difference between companies in the presence and magnitude of the gap. 
The highest control-ownership gap is exercised by business groups while foreign owners enjoy 
the smallest divergence between control and cash-flow rights. In addition, the composition of 
these control mechanisms is not homogeneous across owners. Federal government control 
leverage comes mainly from pyramidal structures, while regional governments are more likely to 
use other methods of control enhancement. In Russian companies less than half of the total 
control-ownership gap comes from the use of pyramidal schemes. This means most companies 
have additional control leverage mechanisms. The correlation between pyramidal and control 
variable effects is weak, while the latter is correlated with some of the standard explanatory 
variables used in performance equations.  
 
These conclusions suggest that standard estimators might be weakened by the presence of the 
endogeneity problem and measurement errors. These results also have strong implications for 
countries where informal control is dominant. Namely, that using the narrow control gap 
definition for estimating valuation effects may lead to the erroneous rejection of causality. 
 34
Chapter 3: Business Groups Impact on Performance of 
Companies 
 
3.1 Motivation and literature review 
High economy-wide concentration of ownership in the hands of a small group of individuals 
became a well-known characteristic of the Russian post-privatization economy. The rapid 
growth of their assets following the 1995-1996 “loans-for-shares” auctions organised by the 
government before national elections, earned them a negative press. Oligarchs’ (a term 
commonly used for Russian business groups) significant influence has been in the centre of the 
public debate since then. The first comprehensive attempt to quantify their economic impact was 
made by the World Bank country economic memorandum in 2003, and it found that business 
groups control around 40 % of total sales in the 2003 sample. 
 
Similar ownership consolidation processes happened in other transition economies. The 
emerging pyramidal structures were often compared with East Asian business groups with 
similar duality in public attitude. Some saw them as catalysts for restructuring and productivity 
growth. Others had concerns regarding the possible spread of rent-seeking and asset tunnelling 
practices. Despite high interest from economists and policy makers, few studies attempted to 
systematically estimate the impact of business groups on the economic performance of their 
companies or on social welfare in Russia. This chapter contributes to filling this gap. 
 
Business groups play a significant role in many emerging economies (Korea, Thailand, Chile, 
India, Mexico, Turkey, as well as Ukraine) as well as in some developed economies Italy, 
Sweden, Canada). Their economic phenomenon is an object of study by several branches of 
economic theory: firm theory, industrial organisation, finance, and development economics. 
Macroeconomic analysis also includes references to the presence of large influential players. 
Such cases include studies on East Asian countries conducted after the 1997 financial crisis. 
There is no consensus both in theoretical and empirical studies regarding the impact of business 
groups on the welfare and performance of companies under their control.  
 
Before discussing the literature results on business groups’ impact, it is important to define the 
term business group. Leff (1978) provided a wide definition of a business group as “a group of 
companies that does business in different markets under a common administrative or financial 
control linked by relations of interpersonal trust, on the basis of a similar personal, ethnic or 
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commercial background”. Subsequently, the theoretical and empirical literature has shifted 
towards a narrower definition of business groups based on equity cross-holdings or pyramidal 
structure of ownership (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006a). This approach is practical from the 
modelling perspective as well as from the limited data availability. However, there are studies 
pointing to the adverse effect of missing out other group connection mechanisms (Khanna, T., 
2000).  
 
In this chapter we use the pyramid based approach to define business groups. In addition to 
information on equity stakes we have access to control level data. In contrast with studies that 
rely exclusively on equity variable, we are able to identify business groups’ boundaries using 
information on control levels and therefore remove the bias introduced by omitted group 
connections. 
 
The vast volume and diversity of the literature studying business groups reflects the 
comprehensive nature of this economic phenomenon. The majority of the literature can be 
classified into two fields. The first one has its origins in the Coase’s transaction cost theory 
(1937) developed and refined by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975). It often 
predicts superior performance of business group companies in developing economies. The main 
explanation is that business groups fill in the institutional voids by providing alternative 
mechanisms needed for the normal functioning of the market. This way business groups help 
stimulate economic growth. Within this field of literature there is a separate branch that studies 
internal capital markets run by business groups. Its predictions differ by country.  
 
The second field focuses on the inefficiency of corporate governance of large diversified groups 
and often predicts underperformance of the affiliated companies. Its origins have common 
grounds with studies on conglomerate valuation “discount” in the U.S. conducted in the 80s. The 
explanatory models often use the toolkit of agency cost theory and incentive mechanisms. These 
studies predict that divergence between control and ownership enhanced through the pyramidal 
structures leads to asset tunnelling and expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders. The 
result predicted is a lower valuation of the affiliated companies (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Claessens, Djankov, 1999). 
 
Using the transaction approach, Leff (1978) pioneered the theory of business groups as a 
response to market failure and was the first one to draw academic attention to the important role 
of “economic groups” in developing economies. One of his findings is that “the group pattern of 
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industrial organization is readily understood as a microeconomic response to well-known 
conditions of market failure in the less developed countries”. Further studies of business groups 
elaborated on the different aspects of the problems outlined by Leff (1978) including internal 
capital markets, contractual and risk-sharing mechanisms.  
 
Kali (2002) analysed business groups from the contractual theory perspective. At the initial 
stages of economic development explicit contracts are not strong enough and relational contracts 
complement them. At this stage business groups expand in size, scope and increase the strength 
of ties. As development proceeds, a threshold is crossed after which business groups begin to 
unravel. Kali (2003) looked at group connections as a more cost effective way to achieve risk-
sharing. These connections replace the functions of the stock market. The author predicted 
dissolution of business groups once the market institutions take over. This forecast however is 
opposed by other studies that show that dominance of business groups in the economy might 
prevent the development of necessary market institutions.  
 
In several papers (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Fisman and Khanna, 2004) Khanna advocated the 
important role that business groups play in emerging economies by taking over the role of 
weakened institutions. The authors showed that Indian business groups are more likely to be 
located in the poor areas and constitute a crucial factor for facilitating development. Castaneda 
(2007) found similar evidence by studying the Mexican economy in the aftermath of the 1995 
financial crisis. He argues that the internal capital market operated by business groups created a 
financial cushion that kept the economy working after the banking system had collapsed. He 
found evidence that business groups helped to achieve a fast and steady recovery of the 
economy. 
 
The contractual theory approach was extended by Hainz (2007) who focused on the enforcement 
of contracts among the functions of missing institutions. She models business group structure 
with vertically integrated production process and the internal capital market. Thus, business 
groups’ organizational mode and financial structure allows for a self-enforcing contract to be 
designed. This theory contributes to the explanation of why business groups tend to perform 
better in emerging economies. 
 
Carney (2008) questions the institutional void theory. He uses evidence from East Asian 
companies and shows that even when substantial progress is made towards developing 
appropriate market institutions, business groups do not unravel or dissolve.   
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In the worst case scenario, a substitution of the institutions that should be state provided can 
instead turn into the state capture. Majumdar and Sen (2007) construct a model that explains the 
formation of business groups through rent-seeking behaviour and coordinated lobbying and 
resulting in state capture. Business groups are presented as coalitions of firms, owned by the 
same family, who engage in coordinated lobbying activities. The welfare impact is negative as a 
result of the resources lost on the unproductive activities. The authors find substantial empirical 
evidence by studying Indian business groups. Similar results were found by and Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya (2003) for a number of Russian regions.  
 
The analysis of internal capital markets, common inside business groups in many countries, 
produces ambiguous outcomes. Cestone and Fumagalli (2005) model the internal allocation of 
resources within a business group and successfully explain both winner picking and cross-
subsidization strategies.   
 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) look at the economy wide effects of internal capital markets run 
by business groups. They conclude on the negative effect of business groups on the finance 
market development and hence on the creation of new businesses. Their model predicts that, in 
the equilibrium state, business groups will direct capital to less efficient affiliated companies.  
 
Gopalan et al. (2007) study the internal capital market functioning in Indian business groups. 
The authors conclude that the main rationale for internal capital market creation is cash transfers 
necessary to prevent bankruptcy of group-affiliated companies. They do not assess, however, 
their positive or negative impact on companies.  
 
Apart from solving contractual or risk-sharing tasks, business groups are believed to be formed 
with the motive of searching for market-power. This assumption is used by Feenstra et al. 
(2003).  He models both vertical and horizontal integration with endogenously determined 
number and size of each group. The model has multiple equilibria with different degrees of 
integration all consistent with the groups profit maximising behaviours. Mahmood and Lee 
(2004) also look at the market power exercised by business groups and its impact on innovation. 
They conclude that share of business groups in the industry can be a good proxy for barriers to 
enter in the industry. High barriers to entry have a negative impact on innovation.  
 
The second field of the literature on business groups evolved from the ideas of Berle and Means 
(1932) who investigated the incentives of professional managers of public corporation from the 
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agency costs perspective. Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that agency costs increase when 
the controlling shareholder owns smaller share in the company. Wolfenzon and Almeida (2000) 
explained the formation of business groups as pyramidal structures enabling the controlling 
entrepreneur to maximise assets with minimum capital costs. They argued that business groups 
can be efficient for the family but not for the social welfare.  
 
Further studies focused on the separation of ownership and control generated by the pyramidal 
structures. Djankov and Lang (2000) showed that a diversion of control level from ownership 
rights has a negative impact on companies’ valuation. Following the Asian financial crisis a new 
wave of literature emerged showing that business groups in East Asia had corporate governance 
problems and minority shareholder expropriation that ultimately lead to their underperformance. 
 
Empirical testing of business groups’ effect is often based on ad hoc assumptions and incomplete 
data. This often prevents the necessary distinction between the various mechanisms of their 
impact. Several theoretical models are often referred to in order to motivate the empirical 
question and/or used later to explain the results. Table 12 contains a list of additional empirical 
studies with a brief classification of the methods and results. 
 
For a long time the empirical literature on business groups was dominated by studies of East 
Asian countries. This was motivated by a very significant role played by zaibatsu and later 
keiretsu in Japan as well as chaebols in Korea. While Japanese business groups were found to 
have negative impact on their companies’ performance (Caves and Uekusa, 1976), early studies 
on Korean business groups revealed opposite results. Chang and Choi (1988) found evidence 
that group affiliated firms show superior economic performance.  
 
A number of studies concluded that group affiliation in Korean companies had negative effect 
(Ferris et al. 2003). Some argued that the impact depends on the size of the business group or the 
number of companies (Choi, 2002; Chu, 2004). The explanations of underperformance include 
cross-subsidisation, conglomerate “discount” due to inefficient diversification. The 
diversification factor refers to the literature on the American conglomerates that were subject to 
a discount in valuation (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Bertrand et al. (2002) studied Indian business 
groups finding evidence of significant amount of tunneling, much of it occurring via non-
operating components of profit. 
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Research on Russian business groups is largely qualitative in nature with an accent on the 
political and social consequences of their existence (Boone and Radionov, 2002; Aslund, 2004). 
There are few studies with a comprehensive estimation of the economic impact of business 
groups. Perotti and Gelfer (2001) studied the performance of 71 listed companies and found that 
Russian financial-industrial groups allocate capital more efficiently than independent companies. 
 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) conducted the first large scale quantitative study of the impact of 
oligarchs on the performance of companies. The authors found that oligarchs run their empires 
more efficiently than other Russian owners. Their estimation techniques included standard total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth model for two production factors: capital and labour, 
controlling for industry, territory and ownership. The time period covered years 2001 and 2002. 
Estimations with the TFP model in levels did not reveal any difference between oligarchs and 
other owners. However, their study is subject to two lines of criticism. The main weakness of 
their estimations is to ignore the possible endogeneity problem. The authors admit that their 
results are not robust to endogeneity and that using instrumental variables for the ownership 
variable would produce more reliable results. The second problem comes from the limited time 
period analysed and the high noise level in the Russian statistics.  
 
In their study of Ukrainian business groups, Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2007) addressed 
the possibility of endogeneity problems and found that oligarchs have a positive effect on the 
productivity of their companies. The authors argued that this result is achieved partially via 
extracting synergies of vertical integration and substituting for the underdevelopment of 
institutions. A general summary of research on corporate governance in Russia can be found in 
Iwasaki (2007). The majority of corporate governance studies focus on the comparison of 
privatised companies versus non-privatised.  
 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) analyse the divergence in conclusions on business groups effects. 
Their two major findings state that business group impact is dependent on country specific 
economic parameters and that this effect can be beneficial for some part of society (e.g. affiliate 
companies) and at the same time negative for others. Morck, R., & Nakamura, M. (2007) 
formulate the conditions under which business groups can have positive impact on welfare. The 
authors argue that some economies need a coordinated “big push” to bring them to a higher level 
of growth and development. In this case, business groups are a better alternative to the state due 
to the rivalry between different groups. However, the success of this approach requires economic 
openness, basic public goods, rule of law, separation of the state from business, and dissolution 
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of the business groups when the targeted level of development is achieved. The authors warn that 
failure to meet these criteria leads to growth stagnation and oligarchic entrenchment.  
 
In addition to these conclusions Khanna and Yacef (2005) list several common methodological 
problems that can also be partially responsible for the difference in results. One of the most 
common methodological shortcomings is a failure to account for the endogeneity problem, 
which results in the persisting doubts regarding the comparability of affiliated and non-affiliated 
companies. Factors and processes behind the formation of business groups remain largely 
unstudied. Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) in their meta-analytical study of ownership 
effect on firm performance analysed 33 studies and found that empirical results in this field are 
often conflicting and inconsistent. They revealed that the governance system, measurement of 
performance, and control for endogeneity are important and usually moderate the significance of 
the ownership effect on the firm performance. 
 
Our study builds on the results of Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) with an attempt to address the 
methodological problems like endogeneity and the high noise content of the performance 
indicators. We use the instrumental variables method to address the endogeneity problem. In 
order to reduce the sensitivity of the results to measurement errors (noise content) we apply long 
difference estimators. The time period analysed extends from 1999 to 2003 in order to improve 
the estimations on comparative performance of business groups companies. As the ownership 
data is available only at a single point of time – mid 2003, in terms of the measurement errors 
including 2003 observations it is as good as using 2002, assuming there is equal probability of 
the change in ownership status during the year. Extending the sample several years backwards 
contains a larger risk of increasing measurement errors in the ownership variable. However, 
taking into account that large shifts in ownership structures happened during the loans-for-shares 
auctions of 1995-1996 and later after the 1998 crisis, we believe that changes in the ownership 
from 2000-2002 were minor compared to previous waves of mergers and acquisitions in Russia.  
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Table 12: Selected empirical literature results of the business group effect 
 
Article Country Year Sample Dependent 
Variable 
Method Results 
Barnes, 2003 Russia 2000 14 large 
BGs
 qualitative Examines the history of formation and close ties 
with state of the Russian business groups 
Bertrand et al, 2002 India 1989-
1999
1000 firms Profit OLS, FE Business groups companies have significant 
amount of tunneling, that is partially reflected in 
valuation 
Bianco and Nicodano, 
2006 
Italy 1992, 
1996
92 groups Debt/Assets OLS, FE, 
robust 
Positive correlation between company’s external 
debt and the entrepreneur’s cash-flow share 
Buzzacchi and 
Colombo,  
Italy 1981 25 groups Ownership OLS Economies of scale, R&D intensity, and 
specialization of human capital contribute to 
group formation 
Caves and Uekusa,  Japan 1976   Group-affiliated companies have lower profits 
Chang and Choi, 1988 Korea 1982 30 largest 
BG
Profit/Equity, 
Profit/Assets 
OLS, 
weighted 
Business group affiliated companies show 
superior economic performance 
Chang, 2003 Korea 1986-
1996
419 
chaebol 
affiliates
Profitability 
Firm Value 
2SLS Performance determines ownership structure but 
not vice versa 
Choi and Cowing, 2002 Korea 1985-
1993
91 affil., 
161 unaffil.
Profits  Diversification has no effect on profits, quadratic 
relationship exists between group profits and the 
number of member firms 
Chu, 2004 Taiwan 1997-
1999
340 affil.
423 unaffil.
ROA, 
Tobin’s q 
OLS Group affiliation can not always create value for 
member firms. The size of the business group 
matters. 
Ferris et al., 2003 Korea 1990-
1995
30 largest 
BG, 250 
unafil.
Value, 
Return 
Com. stat, 
OLS 
Chaebol-affiliated firms suffer a value loss 
relative to non-affiliated firms due to cross-
subsidization of inefficient companies. 
Fisman and Khanna, India 1993 >1000 State OLS, non- Group-affiliates are more likely to (profitably) 
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2004 firms development linear  locate in less-developed states than unaffiliated 
firms 
Gonenc et al, 2007 Turkey 2000 123 affil.,
 77 unaffil.
ROA, or 
Tobin’s q. 
OLS Group affiliation improves firm accounting 
performance, but not stock market performance.  
Gorodnichenko and 
Grygorenko, 2008 
Ukraine 1993, 
2002
2000 listed TFP OLS, 
endogeneity 
Oligarchs increase productivity of their companies 
by exploiting synergies of vertical integration 
Guriev and Rachinsky, 
2005 
Russia 2001 1005 TFP OLS, FE Oligarchs have positive effect on productivity 
growth 
Khanna and Palepu, 
2000 
India 1993 655 affil., 
654 unaffil.
Tobin’s Q OLS, 
clusters 
Affiliates of the most diversified business groups 
outperform unaffiliated firms 
Kim, 2006 Korea 1991-
1998
around 
2000 a year
TFP Fama-
MacBeth 
regression 
Positive relationship between family ownership 
concentration and productivity performance is 
stronger in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol 
firms 
Lensink et al., 2003 India 1989-
1997
694 Investment/ 
Cash-flow  
OLS, GMM Group affiliated companies have softer financial 
constraints 
Perotti and Gelfer, 2001 Russia 1995,1996 71 Investment/ 
Assets 
OLS Group firms allocate capital comparatively better 
than other firms, presumably because the 
controlling bank has a stronger profit motive and 
authority. 
3.2 Data and Variables 
 
Our study is based on two datasets: 1) the World Bank dataset on Russian companies’ ownership 
and 2) the Russian industrial registry. The World Bank dataset contains information on the level 
of ownership and control for a sample of the 1335 largest industrial companies. A description of 
the survey sample selection, method and variable definitions are presented in Chapter 1. The 
Russian industrial registry, Goskomstat, contains sales, assets and employment information from 
1996-2003. Goskomstat data is prone to significant measurement errors and required substantial 
cleaning. Preliminary data scanning revealed a considerable amount of mistypes and errors. 
Some were easily identifiable through validity and arithmetic checks, e.g. negative values for 
sales and employment or year entered instead of sales number. Eliminating other mistakes in 
data recording appeared to be more problematic due to the need of distinguishing them from the 
genuine outliers. To that end we used a general procedure, designed by Thompson and Sigman 
(1999) that uses the resistant fence method depending on the distribution skewness, sample size 
and correlation ratios. 
 
The resistant fence method identifies outliers in the data by the following procedure: a) given an 
ordered distribution of economically meaningful ratios of studied variables, 25q  -the first 
quartile, 75q  - the third quartile, and 2575 qqH  , the interquartile range are calculated; b) 
ratios x are flagged out as outliers if kHqx  25  or kHqx  75 . Thomson and Sigman (1999) 
recommend setting constant k equal to 1.5 for the inner fence and 3 for the outer fence.   
 
We apply the resistance fence method to the 1996-2003 companies’ data, classified by the first 
two-digit of the five-digit Russian industrial code. A logarithmic transformation of variables 
ratios is used to meet the symmetry requirement of the resistance fence method. We construct 
variables ratios with relevant economic meaning for our future analysis, e.g. sales and 
productivity growth. In order to identify entry errors in employment and sales growth rates we 
define 1) the ratio of the observation value at time t to its lagged value at time t-1 and 2) the ratio 
of the observation at time t+1 to the value at time t. This enables to identify the year of the 
outlier. Observation is dropped out if both of the ratios are outside the identified fence.  
 
Following Thomson and Sigal’s recommendation (1999) we apply the inner fence rule for 
editing ratios of the highly correlated variables like sales, employment and their lagged values. 
We drop the observation if the following combinations of variable ratios fall outside of the inner 
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interval: 1) labour productivity, sales t to sales t-1 and sales t+1 to sales t 2) labour productivity, 
employment t to employment t-1 and employment t+1 to employment t. Looking at the 
backward and forward growth rates allows us to identify the time of the erroneous data entry. 
Controlling for the labour productivity increases our chances of distinguishing between 
measurement errors and changes in company performance parameters due to restructuring.  
 
The extended fence method procedure allows improving the quality and information content of 
the analyzed dataset. Table 13 contains summary statistics of variables before and after data 
cleaning ; sales data entries are more prone to errors than employment data. As a result of data 
cleaning, the correlation between employment and sales goes from negligible 0.03 to 0.35 (all 
Goskomstat survey). Note that the correlation between sales and its lagged value also improves 
substantially. 
 
Table 13: Summary statistics and data cleaning description 
 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
obs total 698 1235 1293 1276 1143 1114
obs, cleaned  598 997 1076 1121 976 944
corr(s,n) total 0.83 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.77
corr(s,n) cleaned  0.84 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.82
sales, million 
rubles5 651 1165 1815 2109 2558 3390
employment  3693 2572 2582 2580 2557 2565
assets, million 
rubles 1687 1534 1663 1904 3209 3766
 
Our method of data cleaning is different from the one used by the previous study on the same 
data. Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) used a 1 percentile truncation method. For the major part of 
our analysis we report the estimations using the data cleaning method described above, except 
Section 3.5.2 where we aim to replicate Guriev’ and Rachinsky’s results. 
 
To estimate business groups effects on company performance we estimate the total factor 
productivity function y=f(k,l), where y – output, k-capital, l-labour. Our assets variable is an 
approximation for capital variable. As the data cleaning shows, it is most problematic and has the 
highest noise content. For these reasons, we also test the sensitivity of our results to the quality 
of the assets variable. To that end we assume output elasticity of capital β to be exogenously 
given and exclude capital from the list of explanatory variables. While in the main estimations 
dependent variable is ln(Y) and regressors include ln(L) and ln(K), for the sensitivity test the 
dependent variable becomes ln(Y)-βln(K) and the regressors include ln(L) but not ln(K). 
                                                 
5 1996 numbers in billon, before denomination 
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3.3 Russian Business Groups: Definition and International 
Comparison 
 
World Bank survey distinguished five types of owners: federal government, regional 
government, foreign companies, large private owners, i.e. business groups or oligarchs, and other 
private owners. By aggregating sales and employment under the control of each ultimate owner 
the researchers of the CEM 2003 World Bank survey ranked controlling owners. 22 of the 
largest owners, satisfying the criteria of the 2001 total group sales exceeding 20 billion rubles 
(that is, $700 million) or total employment controlled by the group being above  20,000 people, 
composed the list of business groups, i.e. oligarchs.  
 
Detailed description of business groups’ industrial specialization could be found in Guriev and 
Rachinsky (2005).  Table 14 contains sample summary statistics for the year 2003 according to 
the type of owner.  
 
Table 14: Sample statistics, 2003 by the type of owner 
 Obs Sales, mln rub* Empl Assets, mln rub* 
Owner type      
Business groups     
mean 411 4,401,964 3077 4,734,042
median 626,392 914 352,739
Foreigners  
mean 62 2,666,232 832 1,260,010
median 1,119,715 658 520,830
Federal government  
mean 100 6,288,616 4044 10,749,867
median 3,383,063 2713 4,090,103
Regional government  
mean 56 4,661,751 3556 4,368,197
median 868,651 1392 347,313
Other private  
mean 359 1,537,037 1778 1,281,405
median 640,387 805 239,170
Total  
mean 996 3,459,009 2588 3,893,507
median 777,272 922 367,969
      *average exchange rate in 2003 1$US =30.68 Rubles 
 
Business groups control 40% of the total sales in the World Bank sample Guriev and Rachinsky 
(2005) note; however, that when extrapolating this share to the whole economy caution should 
be exercised as the sample sales are a proportion of the whole economy and the rest of the 
economy can have a different structure. 
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At 40%, share of Russian business groups in the economy is close to the Korean chaebols’ in 
80s. Chang and Choi (1988) found that “the thirty largest business groups accounted for 40.7% 
of the total value of shipments in the manufacturing sector as of 1982.” 
 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) conducted a comprehensive study of the business groups in a number 
of countries.  Their results include business groups’ size, diversification, and integration, effect 
on profitability and market returns. We calculated comparable indicators for the Russian 
business groups based on the comparable data availability. Table 15 compares Russian business 
groups to other emerging economies and East Asian countries.  
 
Table 15: International comparison of Russian business groups 
 Years Firms Group 
firms 
Size group / 
Size unaff 
Group 
diversification 
Russia 99-03 944 411 2.6 6.1
Argentina 90-97 25 11 5.5
Brazil 90-97 108 51 2.5 1.4
Chile 89-96 225 50 18.7 5.1 
India 90-97 5446 1821 4.4 4.2 
Indonesia 93-95 236 153 2.8 2.1 
Israel 93-95 183 43 5.0
Korea 91-95 427 218 3.9 1.7 
Mexico 88-97 55 19 2.3 2.7 
Philippines 92-97 148 37 3.4 3.1 
Taiwan 90-97 178 79 2.0 1.6 
Thailand 92-97 415 258 2.3 3.5 
Turkey 88-97 40 21 1.0
Japan Prewar 32-43 58 17 6.8
Japan Postwar 77-92 1002 94 8.5
    Source: Khanna and Yafeh (2005), our estimates for Russia 
Note: Group diversification is measured as the number of 2-digit industries in which the group      
operates. Size group/size unaff is a ratio of median size of affiliated firms to median size of 
unaffiliated firms  
 
Russian business groups are similar to the business groups of other countries in terms of 
controlling larger companies. Difference in size with the unaffiliated firms is moderate, similar 
to one of Brazilian and Thai business groups and significantly lower than in Japan or Korea. At 
the same time Russian business groups have high level of diversification with the average 
number of industries equal to 6, higher than the record Chilean group diversification level of 5.1 
sectors.  
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3.4 Ownership effect on performance: methodology 
 
In order to estimate the impact of business groups and other owners on company performance we 
use the total factor productivity (TFP) model with the owner dummy variables among 
explanatory variables. This method is commonly used in literature studying the impact of private 
versus state owners on the performance of companies (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). It includes 
uses of capital and labour as Xs and output (often sales) as Y, dummy variable coefficient 
measures the effect of ownership on total factor productivity. Absence of the single theory on the 
way ownership affects performance results in the multiple representations in modelling 
predominantly based on ad hoc assumptions. We estimate 2 types of production function: the 
log-linear Cobb-Douglas specification and the more general, however less commonly applied 
translog form (log second order Taylor expansion). 
 
In their meta-analytical study of quantitative research on enterprise restructuring in transition 
economies, Djankov and Murrell (2002) show that performance indicators (sales, productivity 
etc) or their respective growth rates are widely used to estimate company performance. They 
note that this choice is often determined by the data available and that it does not play a 
significant role if lagged performance parameters are used in the equations. We estimate both 
structural forms of business group effects on company performance: 1) shift in productivity 
levels 2) productivity growth changes caused by the new type of owner.  
 
The vast majority of business group studies exploit the cross-section variation due to data 
limitations and a tendency to use the most recent data (Khanna and Yacef, 2005). For our 
estimation purposes we merge the cross-section World Bank ownership dataset with the 
Goskomstat dataset, which contains panel data on company performance. Assuming the 
ownership structure remained relatively stable after 2000, we estimate TFP models on the panel 
data. We acknowledge potential measurement errors in the ownership variable. However, 
considering that the majority of business groups were formed during the loans-for-shares 
auctions of 1995-1996 and in the year following the 1998 crisis (Iwasaki, 2007) , we believe 
these errors should not bias our results significantly. This section outlines the problems arising in 
estimating panel data models, as well as the problems related to a high content of measurement 
error in performance variables, and the main methods to address them. 
3.4.1 Estimating TFP in levels 
 
We use the standard notation for the log linear Cobb-Douglas production function: 
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  itititit vzxy               (2) 
          
 
In the general formulation, ownership effects are γzit and can vary over time.  In this section, we 
assume that γzit = γdi, so that the ownership effects are time-invariant.  In the next section, we 
allow them to be time-varying: γzit = αt + γdit 
 
We begin our analysis by assuming that the owner has an effect on the company’s performance 
level rather than its growth: 
 
γzit = γdi             (3) 
 
For notational simplicity we limit the number of production factors to one and denote this factor 
by x. We also limit the ownership dummy variable d to one. i identifies each firm and t the time. 
The owner’s impact on the company under his control can be estimated by means of three 
methods: 
 
1) Pooled cross-section 
itiiitit eudxy            (4) 
2) Cross-section at different points of time 
iiiii eudxy   , t is fixed (year 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003)  (5) 
3) Between estimator 

  itiiitit eudxy        (6) 
iiiii eudxy            (7) 
 
The standard literature on enterprise restructuring sometimes assumes the time invariant error 
term iu  to be correlated with the explanatory variables itx : 0)( iituxcorr , whereas time 
dependant errors ite  are assumed to be uncorrelated with these variables : 0)( itit excorr  
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002). iu  can include the difference in management quality or other 
unobserved factors that influence capital investment and the employment decisions of the firm. 
This assumption can lead to the upward or downward bias of coefficient estimators depending on 
the sign of the correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables. In this case 
consistent estimates are usually acquired by using first differences (FD), e.g. estimating models 
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of growth rates, or fixed effect method (FE). FD and FE contain equation transformations that 
eliminate iu , leaving only ite , which is assumed to be uncorrelated with itx . FD and FE methods 
do not allow estimation of the impact of the effect of ownership on productivity levels, because 
the FD and within transformations wipe out the time-invariant ownership effects.  The FD and 
within transformation do not, however, wipe out the ownership-specific time trends, and 
therefore these methods allow estimation of the impact of ownership on productivity growth; we 
return to these estimators later. 
   
Mairesse (1990) in the study of times-series versus cross-sectional estimations questions the 
widespread assumption of the error term structure, in particular the fact that it is exclusively the 
time invariant component of the error term that can be correlated with explanatory variables. To 
demonstrate his argument Mairesse uses an example, that time variant error term ite  usually 
contains all the effects of overtime labour work and capital equipment usage adjustments to 
demand. Practices of the kind are not rare, even more so in Russia and other transition countries 
where informal labour relations are more widespread. This strengthens the validity of the 
argument in favour of a non-zero correlation between the error term ite  and the explanatory 
variables.  
Mairesse (1990) shows that if 0)( itit excorr , “between estimator” can give less biased 
coefficients. As the time-variant error is averaged, its effect will decrease with the raise in the 
number of periods.  
 
In his paper Mairesse focuses on the difference between time-series and cross-section estimates. 
He argues that with the advance of panel data econometrics these discrepancies require 
additional explanation. Previously used data heterogeneity explanation is not appropriate any 
more. To strengthen this argument he analyses six types of estimators: OLS in levels, between 
and within estimators in levels, OLS in first difference, between and within in difference.  
 
By estimating production function for Japan, France and US, Mairesse finds significant 
discrepancies in the estimates of capital and labour elasticity. He subsequently demonstrates that 
elasticity coefficients ranks of the six types of estimators are the same in all three countries. This 
supports the hypothesis of the existing biases in the estimates. Mairesse then analyses the error 
variances and derives formulas to estimate the biases. He concludes with questioning the 
widespread preference for time-series (Fixed effect) estimates rather than cross-section ones 
(between). The Mairesse demonstration of the relationships between the between estimator, FEs 
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and FDs has not received rightful consideration in the related literature. We report “between” 
estimates for both levels and growth rates model specifications, and refer to Mairesse’s 
conclusions in our interpretations and comparisons of estimates.  
 
Certain characteristics of our sample, e.g. differences in firm’s parameters depending on the 
owner types, require additional model modifications. Certain divergence of the true production 
function from its loglinear specification (Cobb-Douglas) of the first order will bias our results. 
For example, positive correlation between output and capital intensity combined with the fact 
that business group owned companies have higher capital intensity on average will result in 
significant positive impact of business group ownership on the performance of companies, even 
in the situations when it is not the case. We apply two methods to address this problem. 1) We 
use the translog production function, that accounts for more complex production factor 
interrelationships and  
 uLKLKLKY  2524321 lnlnlnlnlnlnln   2) Estimating separate 
equations for different owner types. Technically the second option is implemented by interacting 
ownership variables with the factors in a single regression which is equivalent to estimating 
separate equations.6 The method we used allows testing of cross-equation restrictions. The use of 
a cluster-robust covariance matrix means that this can be done without having to obtain explicit 
estimates of the cross-equation covariances.  The Cobb-Douglas function poses restrictions on 
the constant elasticity of capital and labour, which might not be suitable when estimating cross-
section data from many industries. The Translog function does not have this constraint and 
allows the factor elasticities to change with levels of production factors.  
3.4.2 Estimating TFP in growth rates 
 
A number of quantitative studies on privatisation effects conclude that a change in the ownership 
structure can have an impact on growth rates. We proceed with investigating business groups’ 
and other owners’ influence on the growth rates of their companies. This could be presented as:  
 
γzit = αt + γdit           (8) 
For convenience purposes we use the following notation t = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 corresponding to 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 years, so that t  =0. Let us define T as the last period and   as the total 
                                                 
6 We do not interacting factor coefficients with industries in order not to lose a clear distinction between 
productivity effects vs. economies of scale and similar effects. With the same technology across industries 
ownership effects show up clearly and solely in their impact on factor productivity. If the technology varies across 
industry we will not be able to easily separate between the effects of ownership (via an additive ownership term) and 
the effects industry-varying production function coefficients. 
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number of periods. We can estimate the owner’s effect on companies’ performance growth rates 
by using three methods:  
a) First differences estimator (FD) 
1111 )(   itititititititit eexxzzyy        (9) 
and, after substituting, we obtain:  
111 )(   ititiitititit eedxxyy        (10) 
First differencing eliminates any time-invariant ownership effects on levels of productivity, but 
allows us to obtain estimates of effects of ownership on growth rates.  The same is true of the 
within-transformation for the fixed effects estimator.  
 
b) Within or fixed effect estimator (FE) 
iitiitiitiit eexxzzyy  )(        (11) 
and, after substituting, we obtain:  
iitiiitiit eetdxxtyy   )(        (12) 
 
c) Between estimator for differences (Long difference estimator) 

0000 iiTiiTiiTiiT eexxzzyy        (13) 
and, after substituting, we obtain:  

000 iiT
i
iiTiiT eedxxyy         (14) 
Using between estimators once again we measure the impact on the average productivity growth. 
  
First differences and fixed effect estimators are useful for dealing with the possible time 
invariant error correlation with the independent variables and are often used for this purpose in 
the literature. However, under the presence of significant measurement errors both fixed effect 
and first differences estimator are known to amplify this problem (Griliches and Hausman,1986). 
Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) have demonstrated that “errors in variables and other types of 
complex specification errors, which are not well taken into account by the IV (or GMM panel-
data estimators and tend to be exacerbated in the time-series dimension of the data, generating 
larger biases in that dimension than in the cross-sectional dimension.”  
 
The between estimator, on the other hand, can reduce the effect of measurement errors. When 
applied to estimations in first differences, the between estimator is often referred as the long 
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difference estimator. Its ability to reduce the impact of errors in this case has an obvious 
explanation: the growth rate over several years is less noisy than the growth rate in one year.  
 
The long differences method has been largely ignored in the relevant empirical literature. 
However its attractive features in the presence of measurement errors were shown by Griliches 
and Hausman (1984). Assuming a decreasing autocorrelation of the measurement errors, the 
authors have demonstrated that the, long differences estimator (LD) produces a smaller bias than 
the within estimator, which in turn is better than the first difference estimator:  Bias of LD 
coefficient< Bias of FE coefficient < Bias of FD coefficient. 
 
According to Griliches and Hausman (1986) if there is more than one explanatory variable 
subject to measurement errors “the formulas become more complex but can be similarly derived 
provided that these measurement errors are mutually uncorrelated”, which seems to be realistic 
in this context. Below is the summary of Griliches and Hausman (1986) findings on the bias of 
different panel data estimators caused by the presence of measurement errors. The formulas 
derivations can be found in Griliches and Hausman (1984) .  
 
Let the true equation be of the form: 
ititiit ey   ,           (15) 
where i  is the unobserved individual effect, ite are standard i.i.d errors, however only itx , the 
erroneous reflection of it , can be observed. ititit x   , where it  is a measurement error 
with variance 2 . If t  is the serial correlation of the measurement error of order t, biases of the 
first difference, within and long difference estimators for the above model can be written in the 
following way 
 
Table 16: Comparison of estimate biases 
dbp lim  wbp lim  jbp lim  
  21122 )(  x  
-(x2z2)-1v2
  21
2
2 )
1
2
(   jx T jTT  
-(x2z2/j)/Tj)-1v2 
  2122 ))1((  j  
-(v2z2(j)-1v2
Source: Griliches Z., Hausman J (1984) 
 
The first difference estimator bias is higher than the bias of the within estimator for numbers of 
periods higher than two and provided the serial correlation is declining, that is if T>2 
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and 121 ...)(
2  
T
. However, if the time difference is more than one period the result will 
change. The long difference estimator is an OLS estimator on the data transformed in the 
following way: jtt
j xxxd  . For example if T=3 and j=2, the bias of the long difference 
estimator will be smaller than that of the within estimator as long as 21   , i.e. under the same 
assumption of declining serial correlation of measurement errors. This assumption seems to be 
reasonable from an economic point of view. We take advantage of applying the LD estimator to 
highly noisy data. 
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3.4.3 Using instrumental variables 
 
Khanna and Yusef (2005) studied the reasons behind the lack of literature consensus on business 
group impact and outlined several common methodological shortcomings that might be partially 
responsible for it. They identified endogeneity as one of the main shortcomings. There are 
multiple ways to address endogeneity: matching treated firms with otherwise similar non-treated 
firms (e.g. propensity score matching method), using fixed effects with trends with panel data 
before and after treatment, and use of instrumental variables.  
 
Standard OLS estimation requires all independent variables to be uncorrelated with the error 
term in order for the coefficients to be consistent. 
OLS:  uxxxb  1)(          (16) 
plim(b) = beta + plim((x’x)-1)plim(x’u), where plim(x’x)-1 exists and plim(x’u)=0 
 
However, economic priors cast doubt on the validity of this assumption for our data. The 
likelihood that the business group ownership itself is dependent on the initial company 
performance is high. For this reason we use instrumental variables method and check the 
robustness of our results with several statistical tests. We remind that an instrument variable is 
correlated with the estimator but not with the error term. Thus the instrumental variables method 
has two major assumptions: relevance 0)( xzE  and validity 0)( uzE . They should both be 
fulfilled for all instruments and controls to guarantee consistent coefficients estimations.  
IV:  uzzxb  1)(          (17) 
plim(b) = beta + plim((z’x)-1)plim(z’u), where plim(z’x)-1 exists and plim(z’u)=0 
 
At the first stage t-statistics of the instrument coefficients are used to asses their strength of 
identification along with the total F-statistics.  
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3.5 Business Group Effect on Performance:  TFP in levels 
We begin our analysis by estimating the total factor productivity function in levels controlling 
for the different types of owners including business groups. We aim to make our analysis robust 
with respect to several methodological and data problems. In order to minimise the sensitivity of 
the results to ad hoc assumptions we use different production function specifications. The 
estimations below follow the order described in the methodology section.  
3.5.1 Cobb-Douglas production function  
 
Table 17 contains the results of cross-section estimations of the Cobb–Douglas production 
function for five separate years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and also for the pooled sample. 
  ikikiii uDlky  21         (18) 
 
Table 17: Cross-section estimation of the TFP in levels for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 versus 
pooled OLS 
 Pooled OLS 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
K 0.187** 0.304** 0.291** 0.282** 0.303** 0.318**
 (0.023) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) (0.036) (0.043)
L 0.723** 0.786** 0.757** 0.743** 0.693** 0.673**
 (0.038) (0.064) (0.059) (0.054) (0.051) (0.062)
Business groups -0.330** -0.213** -0.307** -0.376** -0.289** -0.244**
 (0.076) (0.081) (0.083) (0.075) (0.079) (0.075)
Foreigners 0.416** 0.389** 0.349** 0.260* 0.242 0.404**
 (0.141) (0.151) (0.117) (0.131) (0.126) (0.108)
Federal government 0.040 0.003 0.027 0.038 -0.026 0.036
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.133) (0.122) (0.124) (0.132)
Regional government -0.090 0.039 -0.079 -0.172 -0.331 -0.144
 (0.162) (0.146) (0.141) (0.143) (0.233) (0.173)
Constant 4.676** 3.866** 4.461** 4.907** 5.101** 4.999**
 (0.532) (0.286) (0.301) (0.283) (0.318) (0.342)
Num of obs 4775 948 1025 1068 934 909
R2 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88
Note: excluded ownership category is private, i.e unaffiliated, companies; 32 sector and 74 territory 
dummies are also included in all regressions, and pooled OLS contains year dummies.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
  
 
The output elasticity of capital and labour are stable in time with the capital coefficient following 
the upward trend from 0.304 in 1999 to 0.318 in 2003, and labour contribution declining from 
0.786 to 0.673. Two other strong trends emerge in the cross-section estimations: the negative 
influence of business groups and positive impact of foreign owners on the total productivity level 
of their companies compared to private independently run firms. Business group companies have 
total productivity that is between 20 to 30 percent lower than that of unaffiliated companies. We 
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also estimate that foreign owned firms demonstrate a premium in performance that ranges from 
25 to 40 percent. There can be two explanations for this outcome. The revealed inefficiency of 
business groups can be the outcome of substandard governance, e.g. resulting from higher 
control ownership gap, or it can be caused by more widespread tax evasion accounting practices. 
Similar factors, but acting from the other side of the spectre, including more transparent tax 
reporting and higher-quality corporate governance, can be responsible for the consistently 
significant positive coefficient for foreign companies. It is worth noting that the federal and 
regional government impact on the companies under their control is not significantly different 
from that of other private owners. Pooled OLS results reveal similar co dependencies. We also 
apply the “between” estimator so as to minimise the possible bias due to the error term 
correlation with some of the independent variables.  
 
Table 18: Between and pooled OLS estimation of TFP in levels 
 Pooled OLS Between 
K 0.187** 0.276** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
L 0.723** 0.751** 
 (0.038) (0.032) 
Business groups -0.330** -0.290** 
 (0.076) (0.071) 
Foreigners 0.416** 0.372** 
 (0.141) (0.141) 
Federal government 0.040 -0.003 
 (0.121) (0.119) 
Regional government -0.090 -0.079 
 (0.162) (0.137) 
  
constant 4.676** 3.230** 
 (0.532) (0.964) 
Num of obs 4775 1207 
R2 0.86 0.87 
Note: 32 sector and 74 territory dummies are also included in all regressions, 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
Between estimator gives similar results: a negative impact of business group ownership and a 
positive influence of foreign ownership. The impact of federal and regional government 
ownership is undistinguishable from other private owners. The standard OLS procedure with 
dummy variables tests the effect of each owner in comparison to the benchmark group – private 
independent owners in our case. In order to compare owners’ impacts between different types of 
owners we use the F-test of the null hypothesis that b(owner_i)-b(owner_j)=0. Table 19 reports 
values for F-statistics and corresponding p-values for the comparison between all types of 
owners in the year 2003 cross-section. Test results for other years and pooled OLS equations 
reveal similar regularities and thus are not reported. 
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Table 19: Testing difference in coefficients 
Absolute difference/ F-test Foreigners Federal 
government 
Regional 
government  
Business groups 29.03 4.78 0.32 
 (0.00) (0.029) (0.574) 
Foreigners - 4.99 7.42 
 (0.258) (0.006) 
Federal government - 0.93 
 (0.334) 
Test k+l=1 0.07 
(0.798)  
         Note: F(1,797) reported; Prob>F in brackets  
 
As predicted, foreign owners’ impact is significantly different from most of other owners 
whereas federal and regional government have the same effect. Interestingly, we can not reject 
the hypothesis that business groups and regional governments have statistically different 
impacts. The results reported in the last row show that one can not decline the hypothesis that the 
production function is characterised by constant returns to scale. 
 
The revealed relationships can have several explanations. The first one assumes that our model 
specification and estimation assumptions are correct, and indicates that business groups indeed 
mismanage their companies and have a negative impact on their level of productivity. A second 
explanation may lie in a misspecification of the model resulting in biased estimations. One 
possible source of such misspecifications can be the use of linear functions to model 
significantly nonlinear production behaviours. Indeed if the average capital to labour ratio varies 
with the owner type, the owner dummy variables may absorb such nonlinearities, and the 
standard Cobb-Duglas function estimation will produce biased coefficients. A third explanation 
comes from the application of econometric methods requiring inappropriate assumptions on data. 
Possible problems include endogeneity or measurement errors. If business groups were initially 
buying underperforming companies, these econometric results would be explained but it would 
however result in incorrect conclusions. As a consequence, we seek to test these explanations 
and include an additional robustness check by testing our results against the ones obtained by 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005). 
3.5.2 Comparing results with Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) 
 
In their study of the oligarchs’ impact Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) estimate level and growth 
TFP equations. Their cross-section estimation of the total factor productivity level on 2001 and 
2002 data concluded to a negative but insignificant impact. We investigate the source and 
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significance of the divergence from our results by replicating their estimations. Table 20 contains 
the output of cross-section estimations using the data and ownership classification as in Guriev 
and Rachinsky (2005). Model specifications are the same as in Table 17, i.e. a loglinear Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital and labour as production factors. 
 
Table 20: Cross-section estimation of  TFP in levels: Guriev ‘ and Rachinsky’s data 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
K 0.280*** 0.296*** 0.316*** 0.380*** 0.368*** 
 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.044 
L 0.642*** 0.569*** 0.599*** 0.506*** 0.538*** 
 0.068 0.064 0.059 0.060 0.062 
Business 
groups -0.006 -0.187* -0.183* -0.145 -0.142 
 0.096 0.084 0.089 0.088 0.081 
Foreigners 0.216 0.157 0.153 0.205 0.372** 
 0.130 0.112 0.157 0.141 0.135 
Federal 
government 0.244 0.261 0.366* 0.134 0.064 
 0.161 0.143 0.168 0.181 0.179 
Regional 
government 0.051 0.075 0.073 0.078 0.082 
 0.187 0.140 0.139 0.158 0.168 
Const 4.601*** 5.209*** 5.183*** 4.733*** 4.853*** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36) 
Num of obs 802 989 921 921 851 
R2 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.87 
Note: 32 sector and 74 territory dummies are also included in all regressions, Robust standard errors in 
parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
 
The overall results are similar to our estimations in terms of direction of owner’s impact, but 
there are small differences in the magnitude of coefficients and their significance levels. 
Business groups still have a negative impact on the productivity level, with significant results in 
two out of five cross-sections. Possible sources of this divergence are 1) a different treatment of 
outliers and data cleaning techniques 2) a slight difference in owners’ classification in cases 
when control is shared 50/50. Note that the classification of companies according to their main 
owner type coincides in 90% of cases. 
 
In order to estimate the significance of these differences for the ownership coefficients their 
covariance matrix is required. To this end we create the combined dataset, by stacking two 
datasets together. Before that all the variables in our dataset are renamed with an additional 
suffix 1. The explanatory variables in the Guriev’s dataset receive corresponding suffix 2. When 
stacking the datasets together we substitute values for independent variables from the other 
dataset with zero. We deal with the correlation of error terms for the same observations in two 
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dataset by using clusters. Clusters are formed by the variable that contains a unique number for 
each company. Under the specification of “cluster-robust” covariance matrix estimation 
procedure allows for arbitrary within-cluster correlation, which we have to account for because 
the cluster members are two observations on the same firm, one used for our estimation and one 
used for the Guriev and Rachinsky estimation. This allows us to estimate the covariance matrix 
needed to test the comparability of the coefficients.  
 
ikikkikkikkik uXfDclkXeDdlky   22221111 4321   (19) 
 
Table 21: Testing difference in coefficients for two samples 
Guriev’s sample 
Our results k 2003 l 2003 
Business 
groups Foreigners 
Federal 
government 
Regional 
government 
k 2003 3.17  
l 2003  1.43  
Business groups  0.01  
Foreigners  0.91  
Federal government  0.14 
Regional government   1.91
Note: F-stat reported  
 
Table 21 contains F-statistics for the null hypotheses that b(owner_i)-b(owner_j)=0. It shows that 
we can not reject the hypothesis of equality between ownership coefficients in our and Guriev’s 
estimations. The conclusions of these statistical tests are that comparison of our results is 
justified.  
 
To identify which of the two differences in estimations, data cleaning method or owners 
classification, is responsible for the divergence in ours and Guriev and Rachinsky’s findings 
regarding the significance of the ownership coefficient, we estimated two additional regression 
sets: 1) with our owners classification and Guriev and Rachinsky’s method of removing extreme 
1% of variables distribution 2) using our data cleaning method and their owners’ classification. 
Our findings show that data cleaning method is the main reason why we get significant negative 
impact and Guriev and Rachinsky get an insignificant negative impact.  
3.5.3 Alternative functional forms: owner-specific and translog.  
 
Although the most widespread production function due to its practicality, the log linear Cobb-
Douglas production function can become a source of errors in some cases. In our study these 
errors may appear for two reasons. 1) Different production functions for different owner types. 
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This can be justified by the concentration of business groups in specific industries. 2) A variation 
in output elasticity to labour and capital combined with significant differences in capital and 
labour depending on the owner type. We address these vulnerabilities by estimating a) owner-
specific production functions and b) translog production function. Economic rationale favours 
the latter option. Indeed, it is more intuitive for output elasticity coefficients to depend on levels 
of capital and labour.    
    
We begin with estimating owner-specific production functions that allow different capital and 
labour coefficients for different owner types. We change the estimated production function by 
replacing capital and labour with their cross-products with the owner type dummy variables.  
 
uakXkdkDklXkXy ii         (20) 
 
Consequently, we test whether the capital and labour coefficients are significantly different for 
different owners. We report the corresponding F-tests statistics in the Table 22, Table 23 and 
Table 24. 
Table 22: Testing the equality of capital elasticity coefficients 
 
Business 
groups Foreigners 
Federal 
government 
Regional 
government Private  
Coefficient 0.353** 0.478** 0.175* 0.645* 0.237**
 (0.057) (0.085) (0.070) (0.253) (0.053)
Business groups - 1.647 4.557* 1.396 2.801
 0.200 0.0331 0.238 0.0946
Foreigners - 8.211** 0.414 7.193**
 0.00427 0.520 0.00747
Federal government - 3.272 0.555
 0.0709 0.456
Regional government - 2.664
  0.103
Note: F-stat reported; Prob>F below 
Table 23: Testing the equality of labour elasticity coefficients 
C 
Business 
groups Foreigners 
Federal 
government 
Regional 
government Private  
Coefficient 0.697** 0.376** 0.486** 0.423 0.691**
 (0.096) (0.119) (0.097) (0.286) (0.087)
Business groups - 5.110* 2.588 0.909 0.00303
 0.0241 0.108 0.341 0.956
Foreigners - 0.507 0.0234 5.536*
 0.477 0.878 0.0189
Federal government - 0.0441 2.471
 0.834 0.116
Regional government - 0.883
  0.348
Note: F-stat reported; Prob>F below 
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Table 24: Joint test of differences in capital and labour elasticities  
 Foreigners 
Federal 
government 
Regional 
government Private  
Business groups 2.555 12.69*** 0.892 5.958**
 0.0783 0.000 0.410 0.00270
Foreigners 4.436* 1.513 4.352*
 0.0121 0.221 0.0132
Federal government 10.67*** 4.968**
 0.000 0.00717
Regional government  3.627*
  0.0270
Note: Ho: ki=kj and li=lj; F-stat reported; Prob>F below 
 
The above results indicate that there is not sufficient evidence to believe that business group 
companies have a unique production function. It is worth noting that the production function of 
federal state owned companies is different from that of other owners and has diminishing returns 
to scale. At this point we can conclude that the negative effect of business groups on their 
companies does not derive from owner-specific production functions. 
 
However, there are some differences in average sample statistics of labour and capital for 
different owners. Table 25 contains the results of OLS regressions on the set of owner dummy 
variables for capital, labour, capital labour ratio and labour productivity. 
 
Table 25: Testing sample differences in capital, labour, capital intensity 
 and labour productivity in 2003 (controlling for industry and region) 
 k L k/l y/l 
Business groups -0.225 -0.269* 0.044 -0.228** 
 (0.170) (0.123) (0.097) (0.078) 
Foreigners 0.646** -0.150 0.796** 0.658** 
 (0.211) (0.140) (0.179) (0.145) 
Federal government 0.130 0.163 -0.033 0.023 
 (0.278) (0.203) (0.164) (0.132) 
Regional government -0.108 0.101 -0.208 -0.215 
 (0.281) (0.207) (0.196) (0.161) 
Constant 13.129** 7.195** 5.934** 6.794** 
 (0.431) (0.270) (0.222) (0.179) 
Num of obs 909 909 909 909 
R2 0.52 0.43 0.54 0.56 
Note: 32 sector and 74 territory dummies are also included in all regressions, Robust standard 
errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Foreign owned companies have the highest capital labour ratio and labour productivity levels. If 
we assume that the true production function is increasing with capital intensity, this sample 
difference can be the reason for the superior performance of foreign owned companies.  
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It is important to remember that transfer pricing, underreporting revenues and undervalued 
capital for the purpose of tax evasion are not uncommon among Russian companies. These 
activities can introduce a general downward bias in the capital and output variables of domestic 
firms. In opposition, employment data is in practice more reliable. If the magnitude of 
underreporting is not correlated with the type of owner, our results will still be valid. However, 
as the transition literature often indicates, foreign owners often have better corporate ethics and 
less tax-evasion activities. This probably contributes to the higher capital and productivity 
indicators of foreign owned companies. 
 
We observe that business group owned companies have lower labour levels on average. Note 
also that a varying output to labour elasticity may result in biased estimates. However part of the 
sample differences are absorbed by industry dummies. Table 26 shows estimations without 
controlling for the industry or regional dummy variables. Without controlling for industry 
specificity both federal and regional companies are larger than privately owned ones. In 
conclusion the higher capital to labour ratio of business group owned companies, together with 
their lower labour productivity, point toward either underperformance or underreporting. 
 
Table 26: Testing sample differences in capital, labour, capital intensity  
and labour productivity in 2003 (not accounting for sector or region) 
 K L k/l y/l 
Business groups 0.218 -0.007 0.224* -0.252** 
 (0.168) (0.115) (0.098) (0.080) 
Foreigners 0.921** -0.372** 1.294** 1.216** 
 (0.207) (0.134) (0.184) (0.151) 
Federal government 2.065** 0.765** 1.300** 0.777** 
 (0.262) (0.165) (0.154) (0.126) 
Regional government 0.880** 0.487* 0.394* 0.048 
 (0.281) (0.207) (0.196) (0.161) 
Constant 12.369** 6.772** 5.597** 6.502** 
 (0.103) (0.067) (0.071) (0.058) 
Num of obs 909 909 909 909 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.14 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
We use translog specification of the production function to account for possible nonlinearities 
and varying elasticities. The higher flexibility of the translog function compared to the standard 
Cobb-Douglas should help incorporating the impact of sample differences.  
 
  uakXkdkDklklkky ii2)(2)()*( 54310     (21) 
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Table 27: Estimation of translog production function 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
k 0.177 0.333* 0.217 0.580*** 0.148
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
l 1.402*** 1.190*** 1.377*** 0.940*** 1.323***
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29)
k2 0.0503*** 0.0358*** 0.0459*** 0.0226** 0.0471***
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0093)
l2 0.104*** 0.0928*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.104***
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
k*l -0.164*** -0.137*** -0.159*** -0.127*** -0.157***
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021)
Business groups -0.182** -0.268*** -0.350*** -0.252*** -0.199***
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.075) (0.078) (0.073)
Foreigners 0.366** 0.314*** 0.206 0.216* 0.400***
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
Federal government 0.0560 0.0301 0.0182 -0.0508 0.0154
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Regional government 0.0451 -0.0750 -0.152 -0.323 -0.117
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17)
Constant 2.512** 2.740*** 3.136*** 2.571*** 3.882***
 (1.12) (0.94) (0.88) (0.70) (0.64)
Num of obs 948 1025 1068 934 909
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89
K elasticity 0.350 0.322 0.312 0.296 0.278
L elasticity 0.709 0.696 0.704 0.696 0.741
 
Table 27 shows that the change of functional form did not alter the results of negative and 
positive impact of business group and foreign ownership respectively. The average capital and 
labour elasticities are consistent with the Cobb-Douglas function estimations. Thus we conclude 
that, independently of the production function specification, business group companies 
underperform compared with privately owned companies in terms of total factor productivity 
level. The negative impact of business group ownership on the total factor productivity is 
significant and independent of regional differences. The next section investigates whether this 
result could be driven by the fact that the initial privatisation process led to business groups 
acquiring more poorly performing firms.  
 
We note that the capital coefficient becomes much less significant and more variable under the 
translog function. We estimate translog function on a larger set of data from the Goskomstat 
survey dataset, without accounting for the ownership type, to find more robust coefficients 
estimate. By having a larger number of explanatory variables, translog specification uses up the 
degrees of freedom and for this reason it is better suited for larger samples. Given that our main 
research question is to determine the impact of business groups on company performance, we 
will continue to use the log linear specification in further estimations. 
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3.5.4 Using instruments to address possible endogeneity of ownership 
 
Endogeneity is one of the major methodological concerns in the literature studying the effect of 
ownership on companies’ performance. If the previous performance indicators of firms had 
influenced the choice of the owner, the current TFP coefficients would be biased. We will use 
instrumental variables in order to address this problem.  A good instrument is a variable that is 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but is not correlated with the error term. 
Finding proper instruments is the most demanding part of this method of model estimation. They 
do not always exist for a particular model, and even when they do exist there is often a problem 
with data availability 
Business groups can acquire companies depending on their characteristics that might be 
correlated with the performance indicators. If this is the case our model will suffer from the 
endogeneity problem. E.g. if business groups were buying underperforming companies, we could 
observe a negative correlation between the productivity levels and “being part of a business 
group” even in the situation where business group affiliation has a positive effect on 
performance. 
 
The possible solution to this problem consists in finding an instrumental variable for the business 
group ownership, i.e. a company characteristic that influenced the owner choice but not the 
productivity of the company in the analysed period. The business groups in Russia have largely 
expended their acquisitions after the loans-for-shares auctions in 1996. Assuming that all 
companies were independent before 1994, we can choose our instruments among the 
characteristics of firms in 1994. We also run robustness checks by using 1995 and 1996 
variables.  
 
We limit our instrument variables analysis to two types of owners for the consideration of 
avoiding the increased complexity of the model estimation. For our main question of interest is 
the impact of business groups on the performance of their companies. Thus we run estimations 
for a limited sample of business groups versus other privately owned companies. 
 
With the aim of finding an appropriate instrument for the ownership variable we estimate the 
relationship between business group ownership and companies’ performance indicators in 1994, 
1995 and 1996 as well as their average growth over 1994-1996. Table 28 contains the 
coefficients and standard errors of corresponding logit regressions.  )()1( xfbgprob  , where 
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x is replaced with one of the variables in the top row of the table in a particular year, listed in the 
left column.  
 
Table 28: Coefficients of one-factor logit regressions with business group ownership as 
dependent variable 
 y k l y/k y/l k/l 
1994 0.121*** 0.218*** 0.240*** -0.398*** -0.0560 0.358***
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.061) (0.081) (0.076) (0.091)
1995 0.0980** 0.246*** 0.232*** -0.370*** -0.0668 0.428***
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.060) (0.084) (0.075) (0.094)
1996 0.0675* 0.266*** 0.293*** -0.268*** -0.0627 0.382***
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.064)  (0.079) (0.11)
average growth 
rate 1996-1994 -0.291 0.399 -0.145 -0.00760 -0.201 
 (0.28) (0.57) (0.70) (0.23) (0.29) 
 
The results presented above indicate that business groups were acquiring larger companies with 
higher capital to labour ratios. The companies that are owned by business groups in 2003 tend to 
have lower returns on capital in 1994-1996. Labour productivity level before 1996 does not 
influence the probability of being part of business group; neither do the sales or revenue to 
capital growth rates.  
 
Among the above variables that are highly correlated with the probability of being part of the 
business group in 2003, the sales to capital ratio for 1994-96 has the lowest autocorrelation over 
time.  This does not guarantee it is a good instrument, because it could still be correlated with the 
error term in the performance equation.  However, these concerns are greater for the other 
candidate variables which have changed less over time.  Therefore we use the sales/capital ratio 
to instrument business group ownership rather than level of capital or the capital/labour. 
 
Table 29: 2SLS estimation results: accounting for the endogeneity 
2003 2001 2002 2003 2003 
k 0.620*** 0.647*** 0.606*** 0.424***
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.041)
l 0.630*** 0.539*** 0.710*** 0.617***
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.061)
Business groups -5.165*** -4.779*** -5.097** -0.191**
 (1.45) (1.55) (2.29) (0.083)
Anderson-Rubin test 
F(1,460) 
69.20
F(1,403) 
49.36
F(1,381) 
59.64 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Constant  5.861*** 5.416*** 4.199*** 3.712***
 (1.10) (1.18) (1.62) (0.30)
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F-stat, first stage 9.15 7.02 3.87 
Instrument:  
y/k 1994 -0.0723*** -0.0676*** -0.0516** 
 (0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0262) 
  
Number obs 531 470 450 450
Note: last column contains 2003 estimations without instrumental variables on the reduced 
sample  for comparison purposes 
 
Table 29 contains the results of two-stage least squares estimation of the business group impact 
on the total productivity levels. We estimate regressions on 2001, 2002 and 2003 cross-section 
data. First column contains results of the one stage OLS estimation for 2003 on sample, limited 
to companies for which information on sales and capital in 1994 is available. This allows us to 
distinguish between the changes in our results due to differences in samples versus changes 
induced by the use of instrument variable for business group ownership.   
 
Low values of the first-stage F-statistics in all the equations indicate that we have a problem of 
“weak instruments”, i.e. low correlation of instrument variable with endogenous regressor. This 
undermines the reported statistical significance of the business group coefficient. As noted by 
Staiger and Stock (1997) if the value of the first-stage F-statistics is small, standard asymptotic 
approximations to the distributions of the instrumental variables statistics lose their validity, even 
for large samples.  Stock and Yogo (2002) have tabulated critical values for Craig-Donald 
statistics (F-statistics in case of single endogenous variable) for weak instrument test. For our 
case of a single instrument it equals 16.38 for 10% maximal size of bias. In all the equations F-
statistics is smaller than Stock-Yogo critical value for weak instrument test. This means that we 
can not rely on the standard t-test to estimate the significance of business group ownership. 
 
To address this problem we use the Anderson-Rubin test of the significance of the endogenous 
regressors as discussed by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007). Anderson-Rubin test reported in 
Table 29 is estimated using ivreg2 command, coded by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) for 
Stata. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural 
equation are jointly equal to zero. The main advantage of this test is that it is robust in the 
presence of weak instruments. High values of Anderson-Rubin test of the significance of the 
endogenous regressors show that coefficient on business group in the structural equation is 
significant, and, consequently, that the business groups’ negative effect on the level of 
companies productivity persist even after accounting for the endogeneity problem. 
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Negative correlation of the business group ownership variable with the returns on capital (y/k) in 
1994 is probably explained by the fact that business groups were mostly interested in the 
companies in metallurgical, oil, and other capital-intense industries. Anecdotal evidence from 
that time suggests that the market value of the assets of these companies was often highly 
undervalued, making them more attractive as acquisition targets for business groups.  
 
3.6 Business Group Effect on Growth: TFP in growth rates 
In this section we study the effect of the different types of owners on the growth rates of their 
companies’ productivity. Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) showed that oligarchs’ ownership 
increases the total factor productivity growth of their companies by an average 8 percent 
difference over other private owners. The authors estimated cross-section regression for 2001-
2002 growth. Since Russian company data are prone to high measurement error levels, first 
differences transformation of these data known to augment the level of such errors. For these 
reasons the single year growth rate estimation is a vulnerable measure and requires additional 
robustness checks. 
3.6.1 Estimating productivity growth rates 
 
We estimate the total factor productivity growth for four years: 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-
2002 and 2002-2003. As our ownership data is only available at one point of time – the summer 
of 2003, the last cross-section is less prone to measurement errors in the ownership variable. We 
also run an estimation on the pooled dataset for all four years, including between estimate. The 
between estimate for the pooled dataset of growth rates is in fact a long difference estimate. Long 
difference estimates were shown by Griliches and Hausman (1984) to reduce the measurement 
error impact on the coefficients. Their result has an intuitive explanation: each measurement 
error in the single year growth rate is averaged out and thus its effect on the performance 
indicator is reduced. 
 
 
 
Table 30 contains results of the Cobb-Douglas production function estimations for a single year 
growth rates from 1999 to 2003.  
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Table 30: Estimating Total Factor Productivity in growth rates 
 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 
∆k 0.132** 0.0448 0.0767 0.120**
 (0.056) (0.031) (0.070) (0.049)
∆l  0.726*** 0.691*** 0.685*** 0.602***
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.084) (0.087)
Business groups -0.0512 -0.0338 0.0983** 0.0538
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.042) (0.033)
Foreigners 0.183* -0.153 0.0449 0.149
 (0.097) (0.11) (0.056) (0.091)
Federal government 0.0953 -0.0913* -0.0109 -0.0783
 (0.081) (0.050) (0.065) (0.061)
Regional government 0.0419 -0.0739 -0.160 -0.0761
 (0.077) (0.062) (0.11) (0.074)
Const 0.325*** 0.0565 -0.105 0.0298
 (0.076) (0.093) (0.094) (0.074)
Num of obs 1028 1047 959 887
R2 0.27 0.30 0.53 0.50
 
The business group impact on companies’ productivity growth is significantly positive only for 
2001-2002. For other years, including the years 2002-2003 which contain lower probability of 
owner miscoding, the impact is insignificant In addition high standard errors of the capital 
coefficients point to the high noise content in the single year growth data. We run regressions on 
the pooled dataset of growth rates and use the between estimation. Results reported in Table 31 
show improved capital coefficient significance and confirm the conclusion of insignificant 
impact of business group ownership on the productivity growth.  
 
Table 31: Estimating Total Factor Productivity in growth rates: between estimate 
 Panel Between 
∆k 0.113*** 0.132*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) 
∆l 0.273*** 0.258*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) 
Business groups -0.0206 -0.0108 
 (0.022) (0.026) 
Foreigners 0.00350 -0.0161 
 (0.053) (0.050) 
Federal government -0.0338 -0.0375 
 (0.039) (0.043) 
Regional government -0.0240 -0.0323 
 (0.044) (0.051) 
Const 0.221 0.00611 
 (0.22) (0.31) 
Num of obs 4554 1182 
R2 0.09 0.2 
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The between estimate is an OLS estimation of the average growth rates for 1999-2003. As an 
additional robustness check we estimate several long difference growth rates. It is worth noting 
that longer difference estimates all have significant capital coefficients. This provides additional 
evidence for the Griliches and Hausman (1984) finding that long difference estimates reduce the 
impact of the measurement error in comparison with the first difference estimates. 
 
Table 32: Estimating TFP in growth rate: long differences 
 1999-2001 1999-2002 1999-2003 2000-2002 2000-2003 2001-2003
∆k 0.183*** 0.164*** 0.190*** 0.131*** 0.176*** 0.244***
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.055)
∆l 0.505*** 0.539*** 0.550*** 0.412*** 0.565*** 0.494***
 (0.072) (0.088) (0.070) (0.12) (0.080) (0.073)
Business groups -0.125*** -0.0264 -0.0297 0.0596 0.00571 0.0880*
 (0.046) (0.065) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.047)
Foreigners 0.184** 0.0569 0.262** -0.0285 0.0415 0.103
 (0.087) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.084) (0.080)
Federal government -0.0290 -0.00748 -0.168 -0.0777 -0.226*** -0.134*
 (0.085) (0.12) (0.11) (0.097) (0.087) (0.080)
Regional government -0.0316 -0.167 -0.0507 -0.186 -0.0868 -0.0567
 (0.073) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10)
Constant 0.475*** 0.481*** 0.582*** 0.119 0.214* -0.00633
 (0.100) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
Num of obs 993 865 877 922 922 973
R2 0.34 0.57 0.41 0.59 0.38 0.35
 
Once again, we do not see any statistically significant pattern of the business group effect on the 
productivity growth of their companies (as compared to the estimates of the negative effect of 
their level). The business group coefficient is negative and significant in one regression, positive 
and significant in the other. Foreign ownership is positive and significant in two regressions, 
while the federal government has a significantly negative impact on its companies’ productivity 
growth.  
3.6.2 Comparing first difference and long difference estimates 
 
To compare the difference in the coefficients of the first differences versus long differences 
growth estimations we generate a combined dataset by stacking two samples. First we append 
four sets of annual growth variables including years 1999 to 2003, then we apply the same 
method as in 3.5.2. Table 33 contains F-statistics and corresponding p-values of tests for the 
equality of the pooled first differences coefficients and the long difference estimates.  
 
Table 33: F-test for the equality of the coefficients as estimated by the first differences versus 
long differences estimations.  
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Long differences 
 ∆k ∆l 
Business 
groups For. 
Federal 
gov. 
Regional 
gov. 
First differences 0.182*** 0.573*** -0.0576 0.362** -0.144 -0.0839
 (0.057) (0.11) (0.085) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19)
∆k 0.573*** 0.233  
 (0.11) 0.629  
∆l 0.383*** 4.293  
 (0.057) 0.0385  
-0.0199 0.297  Business 
groups (0.022) 0.586  
0.0614 5.821 
Foreigners (0.046) 0.0160 
-0.0457  0.823Federal 
government (0.033)  0.364
-0.0526  0.0365Regional 
government (0.046)  0.849
Note: first row contains coefficient values as estimated by the long differences equation, first 
column contains coefficient values as estimated by the first differences equation. Table diagonal 
contains the values of F-stat for the equality of correspondent coefficients.  
 
There is no significant difference in magnitude and sign of the ownership effect, however long 
differences estimation produce statistically significant positive coefficients for foreign owners 
and significantly negative coefficients for the federal government owned firms.  
3.6.3 Capital coefficient sensitivity test to the measurement noise  
In all the previous productivity growth rate estimations elasticity to capital change is much more 
volatile than elasticity to changes in employment. The reason behind it is a higher noise content 
in measuring capital variable (assets) in the Russian firms level data. To minimise the effect of 
measurement error in assets variables on our estimations we conduct several sensitivity tests by 
estimating production function with the exogenously fixed output capital elasticity to capital. We 
use three values that are in the range of previously estimated capital coefficient: 0.2, 0.15 and 
0.1.  
 
Table 34: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha= 0.2 
 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 
∆k* 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
∆l 0.428*** 0.291** 0.259*** 0.544***
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.081) (0.082)
Business groups -0.0761** -0.0505 0.0671* 0.0361
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.027)
Foreigners 0.0514 -0.0857 0.0657 0.0456
 (0.066) (0.11) (0.058) (0.047)
Federal government -0.0715 -0.0490 -0.0358 -0.0358
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.054) (0.049)
Regional government -0.0297 -0.0747 -0.0579 -0.0273
 (0.079) (0.064) (0.096) (0.062)
Const 0.426*** 0.0561 -0.0138 0.0201
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 (0.073) (0.090) (0.091) (0.066)
Num of obs 880 948 889 809
R2 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.27
 
Table 35: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha=0.15 
 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 
∆k* 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
∆l 0.435*** 0.302** 0.266*** 0.555***
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.083) (0.082)
Business groups -0.0786** -0.0533 0.0674* 0.0345
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.027)
Foreigners 0.0537 -0.0861 0.0641 0.0440
 (0.065) (0.11) (0.058) (0.047)
Federal government -0.0726 -0.0510 -0.0351 -0.0388
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.053) (0.049)
Regional government -0.0315 -0.0774 -0.0604 -0.0297
 (0.079) (0.065) (0.097) (0.062)
Const 0.440*** 0.0647 -0.00128 0.0333
 (0.073) (0.090) (0.090) (0.067)
Num of obs 880 948 889 809
R2 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.27
 
Table 36: Estimating TFP with constant capital coefficient: alpha=0.1 
 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 
∆k* 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
∆l 0.443*** 0.313** 0.273*** 0.566***
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.085) (0.082)
Business groups -0.0811** -0.0561 0.0677* 0.0328
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.027)
Foreigners 0.0561 -0.0866 0.0626 0.0425
 (0.065) (0.11) (0.058) (0.047)
Federal government -0.0736 -0.0531 -0.0344 -0.0418
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.053) (0.049)
Regional government -0.0332 -0.0800 -0.0629 -0.0321
 (0.079) (0.065) (0.097) (0.062)
Const 0.453*** 0.0734 0.0112 0.0465
 (0.072) (0.089) (0.088) (0.067)
Num of obs 880 948 889 809
R2 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.28
 
Estimation results in tables 34-36, with the fixed output growth elasticity to capital confirm the 
previous findings: a significant business group ownership effect for a single year in 2002 and 
insignificant or negative for other years. Other owner types do not have significant effect on the 
productivity growth of their companies. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
We have performed a standard estimation of the impact of business groups on the total factor 
productivity of their companies using the Cobb-Douglas production function. This analysis 
reveals that business group owned companies significantly underperform compared with 
unaffiliated companies. We show that this outcome remains valid when 1) pooled OLS or 
between estimations are employed; 2) an increased flexibility of the production function 
specification is implemented; 3) we address the possible endogeneity problem with 
instrumenting business group ownership. We also observe that the production function is 
invariant relative to the owner type. 
 
After robust analysis of data over several years we find no evidence of any significant business 
group ownership influence on the productivity growth rates of their affiliated companies. Our 
conclusion differs from the one reported by Guriev and Rachinsky (2003) based on the 2001-
2002 growth data. We have extended their empirical analysis in several directions: 1) by 
studying additional time periods, including 2002-2003 for which the ownership data is more 
accurate; 2) by applying long difference estimator that is less sensitive to the measurement error 
bias; 3) by using fixed elasticity of output to capital in order to reduce the impact of the 
measurement error, largely present in our capital proxy variable. Use of the different estimation 
methods with the emphasis on addressing the main problem of Russian statistical data – high 
content of measurement error, makes our results more robust and valid.  
 
In agreement with previous studies, we find strong evidence that foreign ownership has a 
positive effect on companies’ performance. This conclusion is robust to the majority of 
specifications. The evidence regarding the federal government ownership influence on its 
companies is less strong. However, its downside impact prevails. On the other hand regional 
governments demonstrate a similar effect to that of business groups regarding several 
specifications.  
 
Finally, our results confirm the findings of Griliches and Hausman (1984) that long difference 
estimates in the presence of measurement errors, give more robust coefficients. E.g. output 
elasticity to capital coefficients become significant when estimating long difference equations 
compared to the single year growth equations that amplify the measurement error effects.  
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Chapter 4 Market Structure Evolution in Russia 
4.1 Motivation and literature review 
Studying market structure dynamics in transition economies has a special interest for industrial 
organization economists. Transition economies provide highly valuable data on market structure 
dynamics that satisfies the conditions of the “natural” experiment due to the fact that initial 
industrial structures were exogenously determined by the state. Indeed the Russian market 
structure provides the unique opportunity to conduct empirical tests free from endogeneity 
problems. In this chapter we assess the validity of the John Sutton’s (1991) market structure 
theory for the evolution of Russian industries.  
 
Several theoretical paradigms were developed to study market structure formation and its impact 
starting from the Structure–Conduct-Performance paradigm and moving towards more 
complicated game theoretical models involving multi-period strategic behaviour of rival firms. 
The empirical results produced by the Structure–Conduct-Performance were largely criticized 
for being more of a “descriptive statistics rather than a causal relationship” (Tirole, 1988). Caves 
(2007), however, argued that the contribution of this field of industrial organization should not 
be underestimated, as it has established a large number of empirical regularities, which have 
motivated the development of more complex models.    
 
One of the major concerns with the empirical tests of the latest models is the trade-off between 
the accuracy of the model and the generality of its application. Models with good predicting 
accuracy are usually very industry specific. This argument forms the basis for the opinion that 
general economic laws can not be applied to build a cross-industry model. John Sutton received 
wide recognition and was highly praised for overcoming this drawback. In 1991 he developed a 
cross-industry model (Sutton 1991) that provides empirically testable and significant predictions 
of market concentration levels. Sutton’s model builds on the joint work with Avner Shaked 
(1987) on the impact of product differentiation on industrial structure. The model is based on the 
analysis of the interaction between two key factors: pattern of technology, i.e. relative size of 
sunk costs, and tastes, i.e. elasticity of demand to advertisement.  
 
The model predicts that for industries with exogenous, technology dependent, sunk costs, market 
concentration should decrease with market size. However, for industries with endogenous sunk 
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costs, this relationship does not hold. A detailed description of this model is presented in the next 
section.  
 
In spite of the concise and testable outcomes of Sutton’s model, there is limited empirical 
research to validate it. However the few related studies provide supporting evidence for Sutton’s 
theoretical predictions. The large part of the literature, however, is narrowly focused on specific 
industries in specific countries: e.g. U.S. chemical industry (Marin and Siotis, 2007); U.S. 
Pesticide industries (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998); U.S. supermarkets (Ellickson, 
2007); Italian motor insurance industry (Buzzacchi and Valetta, 2006). There are several works 
that extend empirical tests to a larger set of industries (Robinson and Chiang, 2005), and some 
that estimate Sutton’s theoretical predictions on data from emerging markets (Athreye and 
Kapur, 2006, Yang and Kuo, 2007).   
 
In his book Sutton tested his model on a set of food industries from several countries. Industries 
were classified into two groups by the expenditure share of advertising. The results were 
consistent with the model predictions that homogenous industries have a strongly negative 
market concentration - market size correlation. The estimated lower bounds for advertising-
intensive industries were not horizontal shift of homogeneous industries, as would be the case if 
advertising costs were considered as additional exogenous sunk costs. The estimated asymptotic 
values for concentration levels appeared to be much higher for advertising intensive industries 
than for homogeneous industries.  
 
Robinson and Chiang (1995) tested Sutton's theory on a wider number of consumer and 
industrial goods industries, measuring R&D and toughness of competition. To that end the 
authors divided endogenous sunk cost industries into three subclasses: high advertisement + low 
R&D, low advertisement +high R&D, high advertisement + high R&D. Homogeneous industries 
were found to converge to concentration levels three times lower than that of advertising-
intensive industries. On the other hand, the authors found a non monotonic market concentration 
- market size relationship in industries with high advertisement level and high R&D share. 
Battacharya and Bloch (1998) conducted a cross-sectional analysis for a sample of 102 
Australian manufacturing industries and found empirical support for Sutton’s theoretical 
prediction that the type of sunk costs determines the relationship between concentration and 
market size. 
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There has been limited empirical testing of Sutton’s predictions in transition and emerging 
economies. Testing the theory on transition economies is especially informative.  In developed 
market economies, we observe the industrial structures that have evolved over very long periods 
of time and that are very stable. In transition economies industrial structures develop from the 
point that is very far from their "equilibrium" structures. This allows us to verify whether they 
adjust in the direction predicted by Sutton theory. 
 
Athreye, Kapur (2006) studied the Indian industries structure and adopted a more flexible 
theoretical approach by assuming that the type of sunk costs influences an equilibrium 
concentration level, instead of a lower bound. Yang and Kuo (2007) improved market definitions 
by including exports in Taiwanese industry data. The findings of both studies were in accordance 
with Sutton's predictions.  
 
The Russian market structure evolution is unique in the sense that during the initial phase of the 
economic transition in 1991, most industries consisted of separate production entities. By 2003 
they had transformed into complex structures with high share of business groups and 
conglomerates. The major contribution of this chapter is to test Sutton’s theoretical predictions 
against Russian transition economy data, with a consideration for hidden horizontal integration. 
 
Russian plants are relatively large and the degree of establishment concentration therefore 
relatively high compared with Western standards (Brown and Schaffer, World Bank (2003)). 
The Russian privatization program, with a few notable exceptions such as Gazprom or the 
national electricity provider RAO-EES, was initially designed to transfer single establishments 
into private hands as single-plant firms. As a result, Russian firms were small, compared with 
Western companies. This generated a peculiar starting point of market structure in Russian 
industries, namely a market structure with a low degree of firm concentration. This makes the 
subsequent horizontal integration and mergers process an expected and natural development.  
 
Brown and Brown (2001) studied changes in the industrial structure in Russia during its 
transition period. They found no strong evidence that significant differences exist in the 
processes that shape market structure in exogenous and endogenous sunk costs industries. In this 
chapter we obtain similar results for the year 2003 if the ownership structure of companies is not 
accounted for. In an additional set of estimations we include this information and conclude to 
significant differences in the market structure dynamics of industries with exogenous and 
endogenous sunk costs.  
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To verify the robustness of our results towards the definition of market bounds we run an 
additional set of estimations on more disaggregated industries samples. The sensitivity of our 
results to the number of observations for each type of industry is checked and is shown to be 
insignificant. 
 
When estimating the lower bound of market concentration ratio, the majority of authors follow 
Sutton in imposing a strictly positive restriction on the error term and therefore do not account 
for possible measurement errors. We use a stochastic frontier estimation method and use a 
composite error term, which better accommodates existing measurement errors in the data.  
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4.2 Model description 
Sutton’s (1991) work is widely acclaimed as a very significant contribution to the game-
theoretical analysis that was dominating the industrial organization literature at that time, due to 
his success in overcoming the main weakness of this analytical method, i.e. high dependence of 
empirical predictions on the model specifications. Before Sutton (1991) many results of game-
theoretic models were industry and institution specific at a very detailed low aggregation level. 
Sutton’s model provides theoretical predictions of the market structure dynamics, that are 
general across a wide set of industries and rely on a small number of easily measurable industry 
parameters.  
 
These theoretically predicted regularities are falsifiable and can be tested across a wide range of 
industries. Only two analytical distinctions are required: toughness of price competition and the 
difference between exogenous and endogenous sunk costs. Toughness of price competition 
definition stands for the price responsiveness to market structure changes. Both exogenous and 
endogenous sunk costs are irreversible investments with a considerably high discount on the 
recovery costs. Exogenous costs are defined exclusively by the current production technology 
and are taken by the market players as fixed. Sutton uses the costs of building a plant with a 
minimum efficient scale as a proxy for exogenous sunk costs. Endogenous sunk costs include 
irreversible investment that are not predetermined by technology but are solely results of the 
firm’s strategic choices. The main example of the endogenous costs is advertising in a broad 
sense including all costs to build up customer loyalty to the brand. In the industries with easily 
differentiated products companies use advertising or R&D expenditures to build customer’s 
loyalty, deter entry of new firms.  
 
Sutton motivates the model by two well documented stylized facts. The first one is that ranking 
of industries by concentration level is similar across countries. The second fact is that negative 
correlation between concentration and market size breaks down for industries where advertising 
and R&D play a significant role.  
 
The intuition of the basic framework is straightforward.  The relative size of the market, i.e. total 
size to the minimum efficient scale (m.e.s.) of a factory, determines how many firms operate in a 
market. The entry of new firms takes place until profits sink to a level such that additional entry 
by another competitor would not be profitable.  An industry with very large sunk costs, e.g., 
airframe manufacturer, pharmaceuticals, will have a very concentrated market structure with 
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very few firms operating because they need to generate oligopoly profits to cover their fixed 
costs. Large markets will tend to have lower concentration because they can generate sufficient 
profits for a larger number of firms.  Fierce competition drives profits down and hence such 
markets can support a smaller number of firms, i.e., they will be concentrated. The model 
derivation is provided by Sutton in his 1991 book in Chapter 2. 
 
In his book Sutton presents model derivation for three types of market structure: Cournot, 
Bertrand and monopoly models. The main assumptions of the model are that the pattern of 
technology and tastes strongly constrains the equilibrium structure of the industry. Variables 
expected to have high predicting power are scale economies, advertising intensity, R&D 
intensity. In the formal model presentation I follow a summary provided by Bresnahan in his 
review of Sutton's book. His brief version of the original model meets the purposes of this study 
and allows us to discuss the main assumptions, methods and theoretical predictions to be brought 
to empirical testing.   
 
A three-equation system determines price, quantity and level of concentration. First equation 
describes demand: )(* PDSQ  , where D(P) is demand per customer and S is the size of the 
market. On the supply side there is an oligopoly equilibrium condition )()( nh
n
QMCP  , 
where n is the number of firms operating in the industry. In equilibrium each of them sells
n
Q . 
The firms cost function depends on 
n
Q . The function )(nh describes change in the mark-up with 
the increase in n. Slope of )(nh is "`the toughness of price competition"'.  These two equations 
determine price and quantity as functions of market size and number of firms, but do not answer 
the initial question of the endogeneity of n. To get this answer Sutton does not make any 
assumptions about strategic iteration between companies, he only assumes that prices at least 
cover costs: )(
n
QACP  .  Inequality in the system does not determine values for n, P and Q. 
Setting )(
n
QACP   establishes lower bound on concentration as a function of S. This lower 
bound is a basis of further empirical testing. Under weak conditions on cost and mark-up 
functions, declining and positive AC and )(nh  going down with increase in n, the lower bound 
in concentration has limit 0 if S . Comparative static analysis shows that for the industries 
with higher slope of )(nh , "`tougher price competition"',  lower bound is higher at any given S.  
 79
 
In the industries where sunk costs   are exogenous this relationship holds. ),( 
n
QAC Depends 
positively on , which will mean lower n in the industry of the same size S and higher  . In 
order to make comparisons between the two industries Sutton redefines size of the market as 
S .   
 
In advertising-intensive industries sunk costs consist of two parts: fixed   and some additional 
advertising costs )(uA , which are endogenous and enter the equation system in two ways, as part 
of AC and also part of demand function via impact of )(uA  on the consumer preferences, u 
being the parameter in consumer's utility function.  
),(
)()(
),(*
u
n
QACP
nh
n
QMCP
uPDSQ



          (23) 
Solving the above system as Cournot model with ``perceived quality'' gives two major 
regularities. The first one is that in the industries with exogenous, determined predominantly by 
technology sunk costs, market concentration should decrease with the growth of market size. The 
second regularity is that in the industries with endogenous sunk costs “increases in market size 
do not lead to an indefinite fall in the level of concentration... and in fact that market 
concentration market size relationship is not even necessarily monotonic'' (Sutton, 1991, p.60).  
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4.3 Measuring market concentration in Russian industries  
 
The dataset for this analysis is constructed by merging the Goskomstat (the Russian State 
Committee for Statistics) annual industrial censuses and the World Bank dataset on Russian 
companies’ ownership.  A detailed description of the survey methods and conclusions 
regarding the ownership dataset can be found in Chapter 1.  
 
The Goskomstat data is an economy-wide database covering the entire population of medium 
and large industrial firms in Russia with annual time series. In order to measure market sizes 
and shares we use sales information. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Goskomstat data are 
prone to significant measurement errors and require substantial cleaning. The data cleaning 
methods employed are detailed in Chapter 2. 
 
The definition of market bounds is a very influential parameter in the market structure studies. 
In the majority of specifications we use the sector definition from the World Bank ownership 
dataset. As a robustness test we also run estimations on more disaggregated sector sample of 
Goskomstat own 5-digit industry classification, The World Bank classification differs from 
the Goskomstat classification in that several 5-digit registry industry codes are merged into a 
single sector in the former classification and may include other companies based on their 
actual production activity. 
 
We compute the market concentration as the aggregate share of the four biggest companies in 
terms of sales ( 4CR ). We choose this most widely employed indicator to facilitate a 
comparison of our results with other related studies. The industrial registry data allows us to 
reliably estimate market shares of companies prior to the wide scale ownership structure 
change. Note that the Goskomstat data of the late 90s and beginning of 2000s, after the 
significant M&A activities have taken place, can not be used alone to calculate concentration 
ratios because it does not contain all the information regarding the horizontal ownership 
connections between the companies. Consequently we use the Goskomstat data to calculate 
market shares for the beginning of the privatization process in 1991, when the majority of 
firms consisted of a single entity.  
 
The World Bank dataset contains information on the ownership of the more than a thousand 
largest companies among dominant industries in the middle of 2003. We are able to calculate 
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market concentrations including information on the ultimate owners of companies. Thus, 
market shares of companies with the same final owner are added together to calculate CR4 for 
2003.  In order to separate the ownership effect from the structural changes, we calculate 
market concentration ratios in 2003 based exclusively on Goskomstat data without accounting 
for the ownership interrelations. 
 
To calculate the relative market size /S  we use proxy variables suggested by Sutton (1991). 
S is the total sales in the industry and   is the set up costs, which is estimated as the median 
factory sales in the industry. Connor et al. (1985) has shown the insignificant difference 
between engineering estimate of m.e.s. and median company sales. However when measuring 
market sizes in Russia, issues arise from the fact that their absolute sizes (real sales) have 
fallen dramatically during the transformational recession.  Indeed if one measures market 
sizes in 1991 and 2003 using their respective median factory sales, the market size measure 
may show an increased market size during the transition period even though there was a large 
fall in sales in real terms.  This could happen because the sales of the median firm fall more 
than total market sales.  An additional complication is that the median firm under central 
planning was a measure of the standard “cookie” size rather than a proxy for minimum 
efficient scale.  We address this issue by using the median 2003 establishment to measure 
market size in both 2003 and 1991, i.e., we normalize market sales in 1991 and 2003 (in 2003 
rubles) by the sales of the median establishment in that market (also in 2003 rubles).  The 
result is a measure of market size that reflects the transformational recession, i.e. market size 
increases between 1991 and 2003 to a lesser extent. 
 
We separate exogenous and endogenous sunk costs industries by the share of advertising in 
expenditures following Sutton (1991). Due to a lack of data on advertising expenditures for 
Russian industries, we use the classification introduced by Brown and Schaffer (World Bank, 
2003) and extrapolate the classification of Canadian industries on our sample, assuming a 
similar response to advertising from Russian consumers.  
 
Table 37 contains data on the market concentration in 1991 and 2003, before and after 
accounting for the ownership structure. It also shows market sizes in 1991 with and without 
correction for the m.e.s size based on 2003 data.  Homogeneous industries are listed first 
followed by the advertising intensive industries.  
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Table 37: Market size and market concentration in 1991 and 2003 
 1991 1991 1991 2003 2003 2003 
2003-
1991 
2003-
1991 
 CR4 
Market 
size 
Market 
size cor.
CR4 no 
ownership
CR4 with  
ownership
Market 
size ∆CR4 
∆Market 
Size
Iindustries with homogenous products 
aluminum 0.407 3.636 3.966 0.546 0.955 4.210 0.548 0.244
bakery 0.061 7.817 8.940 0.067 0.067 8.452 0.006 -0.488
cable 0.431 3.334 4.941 0.320 0.320 4.958 -0.111 0.017
coal 0.377 5.626 6.389 0.237 0.532 6.349 0.155 -0.04
constr.mat 0.060 7.068 7.855 0.075 0.170 7.236 0.111 -0.619
energy 0.149 7.982 8.977 0.199 0.648 9.524 0.500 0.547
ferrous 0.314 4.333 5.779 0.561 0.633 6.926 0.319 1.147
gas 0.826 4.962 5.146 0.797 0.933 5.509 0.107 0.363
machinery 0.104 7.164 8.536 0.217 0.262 8.186 0.158 -0.35
nonferrous 0.289 3.655 6.087 0.837 0.904 6.682 0.615 0.595
oil 0.226 4.853 6.850 0.417 0.633 7.747 0.407 0.897
ore 0.512 3.851 4.363 0.614 0.753 4.771 0.241 0.408
pipes 0.747 3.602 4.136 0.717 0.906 4.860 0.159 0.724
pnchem 0.287 3.480 5.268 0.335 0.546 5.490 0.259 0.222
poly 0.186 8.931 9.815 0.288 0.331 10.079 0.144 0.264
pulp 0.247 6.149 7.632 0.285 0.430 7.573 0.183 -0.059
rubber 0.371 3.511 4.785 0.540 0.733 4.972 0.362 0.187
timbre 0.047 7.826 9.712 0.088 0.097 8.653 0.050 -1.059
tyre 0.529 4.063 4.447 0.615 0.792 4.038 0.263 -0.409
Total 0.325 5.360 6.507 0.408 0.560 6.643 0.236 0.136
Industries with intensive advertising  
auto 0.534 6.213 7.855 0.545 0.745 7.998 0.211 0.143
beverages 0.288 4.884 5.254 0.284 0.413 6.668 0.125 1.414
beer 0.186 6.269 6.067 0.317 0.506 7.330 0.320 1.263
conf 0.182 6.911 7.334 0.355 0.498 7.551 0.316 0.217
fish 0.389 6.888 8.078 0.181 0.223 7.257 -0.166 -0.821
furniture 0.096 6.952 8.864 0.261 0.261 7.435 0.165 -1.429
jewelry 0.750 4.717 6.716 0.515 0.610 6.036 -0.140 -0.68
meat 0.066 6.866 9.167 0.172 0.289 7.826 0.223 -1.341
milk 0.043 7.837 8.938 0.112 0.187 8.385 0.144 -0.553
mill 0.105 5.565 8.281 0.141 0.177 7.348 0.073 -0.933
pharm. 0.242 5.415 6.403 0.209 0.386 5.910 0.144 -0.493
tobacco 0.352 3.387 4.472 0.628 0.797 5.811 0.445 1.339
vodka 0.136 5.536 6.561 0.202 0.263 6.808 0.126 0.247
Total 0.259 5.957 7.230 0.302 0.412 7.105 0.153 -0.125
 
The changes in market structure reflected in Table 37 are better represented by the following 
diagrams. Figure 4 shows the variations in market concentration, measured as CR4 from 1991 
to 2003, before taking into account ownership information, i.e. different companies may have 
the same owner. Only in 7 industries out of 32 have the concentration decreased, with the 
highest amplitude changes experienced in coal, cable, jewellery and fish industries that in 
Soviet period had factories far exceeding the corresponding m.e.s.  In the majority of markets 
concentration has increased, with tobacco, beer, oil and metallurgy sectors being among the 
leaders of concentration growth. 
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Figure 4: Market concentration (CR4) in 1991 and 2003  
(before accounting for ownership structure) 
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After accounting for changes in the ownership structure it is clear that market concentration in 
2003 is higher than in 1991 in all but three industries.  This is illustrated in Figure 5 where 
many industries went through wide scale consolidation processes. Concentration ratios in 
aluminum, energy and metallurgy industries have changed the most, by up to 20 percentage 
points in 4CR  after taking into account information on the ownership structures. This might 
be explained by the fact that these industries are dominated by business groups, which were 
responsible for the largest share of horizontal integration of companies. Two waves of 
mergers and acquisitions have driven much of Russia's recent enterprise restructuring and 
market consolidation. 
 
Figure 5: Market concentration (CR4) in 1991 and 2003  
(after accounting for the impact of ownership structure) 
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The relationship between industries concentration levels and their sizes in 1991 is shaped by 
the laws of the Soviet economic system. The standardization, i.e. the "cookie-cutter" 
approach, convenient from the central planner’s point of view, was widely used for the 
purposes of industrial development. It was common that the central planning agency would 
choose a fixed size for a factory in a particular industrial activity, and then build several other 
replicas. As the turnover for this particular output increased in size, the planners would 
construct more factories. The widespread cross-subsidizing, low transport and energy tariffs 
and other existing biases in the pricing mechanism of this planned economy prevented the 
standard plant scale to be equivalent to the minimum efficient scale. The correction of the 
market size measurement in 1991 is predominantly on the upper side due to the fact that a 
median size Soviet factory was larger than the m.e.s. plant, defined as the median size plant in 
2003. Since Russia was essentially a closed economy, firms did not face direct competition 
with from imports. Taken to the extreme, the central planner’s approach to designing the 
industrial structure would mean that the market concentration- market size relationship would 
fit the nCR /44   curve, where n is the number of companies. 
 
Although real 1991 data do not precisely fit the above equation, the concentration ratios in 
1991 are very close to the benchmark line, especially if compared to the market structure 
graph in 2003. The observed negative relationship of the concentration level and the market 
size is not a result of strategic interaction of companies and market forces but rather an 
optimal solution to the central planner’s task. In 2003 concentration levels have gone up in 
most industries and market sizes have recovered from the substantial fall during transition 
years. Although the negative trend of 4CR  with market size can still be observed in the scatter 
plots, the gap in concentration levels of industries with similar market sizes has substantially 
widened. Note that for any particular market size the variance of 4CR  increases in 2003 
compared to that of 1991. 
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Figure 6: Change in market concentration from 1991 to 2003, 
 and accounted for the ownership structure 
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Figure 6 depicts the dynamics of market structure changes in Russian industries between 1991 
and 2003. The graph is constructed so that each oriented line, corresponding to a different 
industry, comprises three data points. The first and second data points represent the levels of 
concentration and market size in 1991 and 2003 respectively, without accounting for 
ownership information. The final point, indicated by the position of the arrow, reflects the 
correction in concentration level due to ownership connections. Figure 7 and Figure 8 are 
constructed in a similar manner and illustrate market structure changes for homogeneous and 
intensive-advertising industries respectively. 
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Figure 7: Market concentration change in the homogeneous industries 
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Figure 8: Market concentration change in industries with intensive advertising 
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With the exception of energy and chemical sectors, homogenous industries exhibit a strong 
negative correlation between concentration level and industry size. There are many 
homogeneous industries clustered at the high end of the bound – these are industries with high 
m.e.s., such as metallurgy, oil, gas and ore. These industries have a large export component 
and should, in theory, be analyzed in more global or at least regional context. This correction 
would both increase the market size and lower the concentration ratios of these industries.  
 
Intensive advertising industries demonstrate an even higher divergence between the market 
structures in 1991 and 2003. Particularly high variations in concentration ratios can be 
observed at the low end of the market structure bound. This is in good agreement with 
theoretical predictions. In the next section we use stochastic frontier method to estimate the 
data trends and relationships outlined above.   
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4.4 Lower bound for market concentration 
 
In this section we seek to assess the market concentration - market size relationship. 
Following Sutton (1991) we model the market concentration as the hyperbolic 
function umsizeCR  ln/ln 4  , where 4CR  is the market concentration defined as the 
market share of the four largest firms in the industry, msize  is the market size proxy 
calculated as the ratio of the total sales in the industry to the median firm sales, α is a 
threshold to which market structure converges when the market size goes to infinity, β is a 
reverse elasticity of concentration level to market size changes and u is a composite error 
term.  
 
Many empirical studies testing the validity of Sutton’s predictions assume a non-negative 
distribution of the error term, e.g. a normal distribution defined for positive variables only. 
We will refer to this distribution as the positive distribution. However, we believe that this 
condition on the error term may exaggerate the impact of outliers and possible measurement 
errors on the results. Since the transition company level data is highly prone to measurement 
errors we find it more practical to define the composite error term iu  such that iii vu  , 
where iv  has a positive distribution and i is a normally distributed standard error term. This 
second term adds flexibility to our estimation and incorporates possible measurement errors in 
the industry concentration ratios that may be negative.  
 
The bound for market concentration is estimated with the maximum likelihood method with 
the help of the frontier procedure implemented in the econometric software Stata, which 
enables us to account for the two error terms iv  and i  previously described. Estimations 
with different functional forms of the lower bound equation produced similar results. 
Therefore we only report the results obtained with the hyperbolic equation detailed above. 
 
Sunk costs theory of market structure predicts a different relationship between concentration 
level and market size for industries with exogenous sunk costs, i.e. homogeneous industries, 
and industries with endogenous sunk costs, i.e. industries with intensive advertising or high 
R&D expenditures. The market concentration in homogeneous industries should decline with 
the expansion of the relative market size. On the other hand, for intensive advertising 
industries this relationship does not have to hold or be monotonic. We test these predictions 
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on Russian industry data in 1991 and 2003, with and without ownership structure correction 
in market concentration ratios. To that end we use a modified model defined as: 
  vad
msize
ad
msize
adCR *
ln
)1(*
ln
*ln 21214 ,    (24) 
where ad is the dummy variable for industries with intensive advertising. This model allows 
different levels and slopes of the lower bound for two types of industry. Theoretical 
predictions indicate a positive and statistically significant 1  coefficient (as the equation 
includes the inverse market size measure it will signify negative relationship between the 
parameters) and a statistically insignificant 2  coefficient in 2003, after the market forces and 
strategic firm’s behaviour had shaped the market structure. In 1991 we expect both 
coefficients to be significant and positive due to the specificity of the central planner’s 
approach to the industrial structure formation.  
 
Theoretical implications for concentration lower bound do not suggest constant and 
independent error term. One consequence of the fact that the market concentration does not 
converge to zero when the market size is going to infinity could be positive relationship 
between variance and market size. Allowing for correlation between the positive error 
component variance (σ2ν) and the explanatory variable (1/lnmsize) is standard for frontier 
estimations; however, this implication is usually not tested in the lower bound literature. We 
account for this possibility by imposing the heteroskedastic structure on the non-negative 
error component. According to the economic priors available to us, the positive error term can 
be correlated with the market size and type of industry. We estimate four specifications of the 
error term structure: 
 
1) const2   
2) )1(*ln 4321
2 admsizeadmsizead    
3) )1(*ln 431
2 admsizeadmsize    
4) ad21
2    
 
4.4.1 Lower bound estimation: 32 industries 
Table 38 contains the estimation results of the lower bound for market concentration in 32 
sectors, defined in the World Bank ownership database for 1991. 
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Table 38: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 1991 
 1991 1991 1991 1991 
ad -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.416***
 (0.00016) (0.000098) (0.00015) (0.000055)
1/msize *ad 22.32*** 22.32*** 22.32*** 22.32***
 (0.00081) (0.00051) (0.00083) (0.00032)
1/msize*(1-ad) 19.08*** 19.08*** 19.08*** 19.08***
 (0.00058) (0.00033) (0.00049) (0.00017)
Const -5.187*** -5.187*** -5.187*** -5.187***
 (0.00013) (0.000071) (0.00011) (0.000040)
2ln   -33.58 -32.37 -32.38 -32.92
 (574) (193) (291) (132)
  
2ln    
ad -2.689  0.348
 (4.22)  (0.51)
msize *ad 0.346 0.00940 
 (0.56) (0.16) 
msize*(1-ad) -0.0793 -0.0500 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Const 0.634** 0.983 0.778 0.477
 (0.25) (1.18) (1.13) (0.32)
Test of coeff. equal. >100 >100 >100 >100
chi2(  1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loglikelihood -33.36 -32.83 -33.03 -33.98
Obs 32 32 32 32
Note: 
2
 is a variance of normally distributed error term and 2  is variance of positively         
distributed error term 
 
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions, namely that the inverse relationship 
between concentration level and market size is significant for both types of industries. The 
statistical test for the exact equality of the slope coefficients in the lower bound equations is 
rejected; however the difference between the coefficients is small in absolute terms. It is 
worth noting that at the starting point of market transformations, endogenous sunk costs 
industries had a lower level of concentration. There is no evidence that the variance of the 
positive error component changes with market size, which is in line with the economic 
intuition on the structure of industry in planned economy.  
 
Table 39: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 2003 
before taking into account ownership structure 
 2003 2003 2003 2003 
ad 2.409*** 2.409*** 2.409*** 2.409***
 (0.0027) (0.00043) (0.00029) (0.00047)
1/msize *ad 14.89*** 14.89*** 14.89*** 14.89***
 (0.018) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0015)
1/msize*(1-ad) 27.12*** 27.12*** 27.12*** 27.12***
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 (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0028)
Const -6.258*** -6.258*** -6.258*** -6.258***
 (0.00040) (0.00030) (0.00019) (0.00041)
2ln   -31.55 -30.53 -32.51 -31.93
 (374) (220) (392) (264)
  
2ln    
ad 1.757  -1.024**
 (3.50)  (0.51)
msize *ad -0.0999 0.0901 
 (0.43) (0.21) 
msize*(1-ad) 0.299 0.242 
 (0.24) (0.21) 
const 0.814*** -0.960 -0.560 1.116***
 (0.25) (1.63) (1.42) (0.32)
loglikelihood -36.26 -33.54 -33.67 -34.42
obs 32 32 32 32
Note: 
2
 is a variance of normally distributed error term and 2  is variance of positively 
distributed error term 
 
Table 40: Lower bound estimation for market concentration in 2003 
 after accounting for ownership structure of firms 
 2003 2003 2003 2003 
ad 0.0276 1.037 1.506 1.230
 (3.00) (3.10) (2.86) (2.61)
1/msize *ad 21.62 20.73 21.13 21.62
 (19.8) (16.8) (17.1) (15.7)
1/msize*(1-ad) 24.92*** 22.91* 26.78*** 24.77***
 (7.22) (12.5) (8.53) (7.85)
const -3.499 -4.357** -4.869*** -4.647***
 (17.6) (2.09) (1.67) (1.34)
2ln   0.224 -0.234 -0.192 -0.238
 (0.94) (0.47) (0.48) (0.45)
2ln    
ad  -12.01
  (282)
msize *ad -1.127 -1.078 
 (2.65) (4.74) 
msize*(1-ad) -0.0862 0.0976 
 (0.45) (0.15) 
const -5.288 1.410  0.828
 (619) (3.00)  (0.96)
loglikelihood -49.02 -48.12 -48.23 -48.15
obs 32 32 32 32
Note: 
2
 is a variance of normally distributed error term and 2  is variance of positively  
distributed error term 
 
Table 39 and Table 40 contain results of the lower bound estimation for market concentration 
level in 2003, before and after accounting for the ownership structure. Without accounting for 
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this information, i.e. ignoring the de-facto horizontal integration of some companies, our 
estimations do not show any significant differences between the two types of industries. The 
coefficients for the inverse market size in both equations are positive and significant. 
However, the lower bound for homogeneous industries decreases and has a sharper slope 
compared with advertising intensive industries. At the same time the floor for market 
concentration is higher for advertising intensive industries. The relationship between variance 
of the positive error component and market size and type of industry is insignificant and thus 
going forward we assume it to be constant. 
 
Including ownership information in the calculus of concentration levels substantially modifies 
the previous results. Indeed, the slope coefficient becomes insignificant. This means the lower 
market concentration bound for intensive advertising industries appears to be independent of 
the market size. The concentration ratio in homogenous industries consistently exhibits a 
negative correlation with the market size. These results are in good agreement with Sutton’s 
theory of market structure and provide additional evidence that the market forces and strategic 
interaction between firms are shaping the industrial landscape in one of the transition 
economies. The predicted lower bounds for industries with exogenous and endogenous sunk 
costs are depicted in Figure 9 and Figure 10 with continuous and dotted lines respectively. 
 
Figure 9: Lower bound for market concentration in 1991 by the type of industry 
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Figure 10: Lower bound for market concentration in 2003  
after accounting for ownership structure of firms by the type of industry 
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The above estimations were based on the industry classification defined in the World Bank 
ownership database (Chapter 2 CEM World Bank (2003). The definition of market size and 
its relationship to industry classification is a separate topic of research on its own and requires 
complicated estimations of the cross-product elasticities of substitution. These estimations are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, to strengthen the validity of our results we 
test their sensitivity to different industry classifications. We conduct the robustness check by 
estimating our equations on the set of more disaggregated sectors. 
4.4.2 Lower bound estimation: 60 industries  
Table 41 contains statistics for the 60 industries sample classified by the 5-digit codes used in 
the Russian industrial registry. These 60 industries make up 32 aggregated sectors that were 
analyzed above. We recalculate market sizes and concentration levels based on the new 
market bounds definitions. The type of each industry is defined by the type of the aggregated 
sector it belongs to.  
 
 94
Table 41: Sample statistics for 60 industries 
  1991  2003  
 CR4 ln(S/sigma) CR4 ln(S/sigma)
homogeneous  mean 0.559 5.54 .628 5.19
N=45 median 0.592 5.42 .642 4.89
with intensive advertising  mean 0.321 7.03 .421 6.76
N=15 median 0.294 6.72 .372 6.96
 
For the sample of disaggregated industries, market concentration also increased between 1991 
and 2003 in the majority of cases for both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs industries. 
After the significant decline in the middle 90s, market size has recovered in many industries. 
Table 42 contains results of the lower bound estimations for 60 disaggregated industries in 
1991 and 2003 with and without accounting for the ownership consolidation. As in the 32 
sectors case there is no strong evidence supporting the positive error term heteroscedasticity 
and allowing for this error term structure does not change our results significantly. For these 
reasons we do not report these results. 
 
Table 42: Lower bound estimation for market concentration for more disaggregated sectors 
 1991 2003 before 
2003 with 
ownership 
ad -1.940* 0.424*** 0.312 
 (1.16) (0.0011) (1.64) 
1/msize *ad 18.35** 14.31*** 12.95 
 (7.26) (0.0076) (10.7) 
1/msize*(1-ad) 9.525*** 11.55*** 13.22*** 
 (1.78) (0.00014) (1.20) 
const -3.101*** -4.176*** -3.735*** 
 (0.44) (0.000066) (0.36) 
2ln   -0.896* -31.21 -2.369** 
 (0.50) (151) (0.99) 
2ln   0.587 1.420*** 1.484*** 
 (0.43) (0.18) (0.23) 
loglikelihood -81.42 -89.02 -98.04 
obs 60 60 60 
Note: 
2
 is a variance of normally distributed error term and 2  is variance of 
positively distributed error term 
 
The estimations market concentration – market size relationship for a set of more 
disaggregated industries are consistent with previous conclusions. Homogeneous industries 
have a lower market concentration bound that is decreasing with the market size. This 
relationship does not hold for intensive advertising industries. 
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4.4.3 Testing the effect of industry sample 
The above findings for both industry samples are consistent with Sutton’s theoretical 
predictions: there is a significant negative relationship between market size and market 
structure for both industry types in 19 and 45 industries from the aggregated and 
disaggregated sectors respectively. However, both samples have a larger number of 
observations for homogeneous industries than for advertisement intensive industries.   
 
In our first set of regressions we have 19 observations for homogeneous industries and 13 for 
advertisement intensive sectors. In the second set of regressions the number of industries of a 
second type increases slightly. However, the imbalance increases with the samples size.  
 
In order to assess whether the concentration’s lower bound independence of the market size in 
2003 is driven by the imbalance in the number of observations, we run the estimations on an 
equal number of observations for both types of industries. As a robustness check we estimate 
regressions for every possible combination of 13 industries out of 19, where the total number 
of simulations is )!(!/! knknCnk   and equals 17136. Table 43 contains the summary results 
of these simulations. 
 
Table 43: Testing sensitivity of our results to the sample composition 
Null hypothesis F(beta=0)<0.05 
b[1/msize_ad]=0 71 
b[1/msize_no]=0 16319 
Total number of regressions 17136 
 
The lower bound coefficient for homogeneous industries is significant in 95% of regressions. 
For advertising intensive industries it is insignificant in 99.6% of regressions. The above 
simulations show that our results are robust to sample changes and are not driven by the 
smaller number of observations in the case of intensive advertising industries.   
4.4.4 Lower bound estimation: time shift 
In this section we test the time shift in the lower market concentration bound for both types of 
industries. In the first set of regressions we look at the 1991 and 2003 data before taking into 
account the ownership structure. In the second set we estimate the total shift in market 
structure from 1991 to 2003 corrected for horizontal integration. Table 44 reports results 
separately for homogeneous and advertising-intensive industries. 
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Table 44: Estimating the lower bound for market concentration change  
from 1991 to 2003 by the type of industry 
 Homogeneous industries With intensive advertising 
 
1991, 2003 
entities level
1991, 2003 
with ownership
1991, 2003 
entities level 
1991, 2003 
with ownership
T=1 for 2003, 0 for 1991 -1.071*** 0.802 1.753*** -1.354
 (0.00013) (1.34) (0.00036) (3.19)
1/msize 2003 27.12*** 24.92*** 14.89*** 40.23*
 (0.00071) (6.66) (0.0024) (23.7)
1/msize 1991 19.08*** 19.75*** 22.32*** 22.32***
 (0.00039) (4.88) (0.00082) (0.0023)
const -5.187*** -4.249 -5.602*** -5.602***
 (0.000084) (34.4) (0.00017) (0.00040)
2ln   -31.37 0.0639 -32.17 -29.40
 (120) (0.29) (392) (231)
2ln   0.847*** -10.29 0.524* 0.682**
 (0.23) (14755) (0.28) (0.28)
time shift Chi2 test  >100 0.392 >100 0.571
p-value 0 0.531 0 0.450
loglikelihood -43.67 -55.13 -25.69 -27.74
obs 38 38 26 26
Note: 
2
 is a variance of normally distributed error term and 2  is variance of positively distributed 
error term 
 
This model specification strengthens the validity of our previous results. For industries with 
exogenous sunk costs the concentration ratio is always negatively related to the market size 
and this trend is amplified in 2003. The lower bound level is significantly lower in 2003 than 
1991 before we apply the ownership structure. This can be explained by the high entity level 
concentration in the Soviet economy, and which has decreased after its collapse. However 
once we move back to the company level (by accounting for the ownership structure) this 
difference becomes insignificant. 
 
Market concentration in advertising intensive industries seems responsive to changes in the 
market size in 2003 before ownership structure adjustment in the data, but to a lesser degree 
than in 1991. Its significance declines sharply once the concentration numbers include hidden 
horizontal integration. The predicted lower bounds for years 1991 and 2003 are depicted on 
Figure 11 as continuous and dotted lines respectively. 
 
 97
Figure 11: Lower bound shift from 1991 to 2003 by the type of industry  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
The Russian economy went through a wide-scale transformation during the last decade. This 
chapter has focused on the evolution of its market structure. Our empirical analysis is based 
on the theoretical developments by Sutton (1991) on cross-industry determinants of market 
structure. Merging government census data on firms and individual establishments with the 
World Bank ownership database makes it possible, in effect, to reconstruct multi-plant firms 
and conglomerates and consequently calculate market concentration level better reflecting 
economic realities. Contrary to standard estimation methods employed in the literature, the 
method we apply allows us to take account of measurement errors. This is important 
considering the high noise content in Russian statistical data.  
 
Our results confirm Sutton’s theoretical predictions. In 1991, before the economic transition, 
both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs industries had a market concentration lower 
bound that was inversely related to the market size. In 2003, however, significant differences 
appear between both types of industries when ownership structure information is accounted 
for. Thus the market concentration ratios become independent of the market size for industries 
with intensive advertising.  
 
We conduct additional robustness checks by 1) replicating the estimations on disaggregated 
industries; 2) by considering an equal number of observations for two types of industries and 
varying the matching observations mix of homogenous industries. Both procedures lead to 
conclusions that are in agreement with our initial findings.   
 
These results are in line with Sutton’s theory of market structure formation and provide 
additional evidence that the market forces and strategic interaction between firms are shaping 
the industrial landscape in Russia. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis starts by exploring ownership and control structures based on a set of large 
Russian companies. We learn that the main stakeholder can exercise control level higher than 
his ownership stake via several methods: by creating pyramidal structures which is commonly 
accounted for in the literature, by using affiliated management or by controlling supply and 
delivery networks or debt arrears. We estimate and decompose the total control-ownership 
gap into two components: pyramidal and informal. This chapter contributes to the existing 
literature in two ways: 1) by revealing the significance of the widely omitted non-pyramidal 
component of the control-ownership gap; 2) by expanding our knowledge of the ownership 
and control structures of Russian corporations. 
 
Russian companies have a high concentration of ownership by international standards. The 
control-ownership gap is among the highest in the world once we account for its full size. 
Less than a half of the control-ownership gap comes from pyramidal structures, the rest is 
exercised via less formal channels of control. We not only find that the size of the omitted 
control–ownership gap is substantial compared to the pyramidal gap, but also that it varies 
with the type of owner. The high correlation of omitted variables with some explanatory 
variables leads to biased estimators. We acknowledge that great care must be employed when 
extrapolating our results to other countries. Nevertheless these results strongly indicate that 
studies on the impact of control-ownership gap on the performance of companies may be 
biased when omitting the non-pyramidal component.  
 
We find that control-ownership patterns differ substantially according to the type of 
institutional owner: business groups have the highest control-ownership leverage with 60 % 
of it coming from less formal methods. Foreign owners are on the opposite end of the control-
ownership gap scale. It is worth noting that federal and regional governments differ in a way 
they control their companies: federal government is more likely to use pyramidal structures 
while regional governments often employ other methods of control-ownership leverage. 
  
In the third chapter we studied the influence of business groups and other institutional owners 
on the performance of companies. Large sample quantitative studies on business groups in 
transition economies remain scarce and this chapter contributes to expanding our knowledge 
in this field. In addition we use several additional estimation techniques to address the known 
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problems in the literature. We find that companies owned by business groups tend to have 
lower productivity levels. We employ several methods to check the robustness of this result: 
1) looking at the additional time periods separately as well as applying panel-data methods; 2) 
examining alternative production function forms; 3) introducing instrumental variables to 
address the endogeneity problem. These estimations confirm the business groups’ adverse 
impact on companies’ performance.  
 
Consequently, we study the productivity growth factors. Our work builds on the results of 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005), and we advance their analysis in several directions: 1) by 
supplementing the one-year cross-section with additional time periods; 2) by using long-
difference estimation method in order to minimise the impact of measurement errors; 3) by 
testing different levels of fixed elasticity of output to capital.  The majority of our estimation 
results do not show any statistically significant role of business group ownership in the firms’ 
productivity growth.  The introduction of the control-ownership measure, as calculated in 
chapter 2, as  an explanatory variable in productivity equations, can be an interesting 
extension of this research. This could be used to address the question whether the control-
ownership gap has a direct impact on companies’ performance or this impact is owner 
specific. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the evolution of the market structure.  Information on ownership and 
control structures allows calculating realistic concentration ratios in Russian industries. The 
unique starting point of the market structure changes makes it possible to test the theory of 
market structure formation by Sutton (1991) without dealing with the endogeneity problems. 
The empirical literature studying the validity of Sutton’s predictions is not abundant and is 
often focused on specific industries in advanced countries. The main contributions of this 
chapter are 1) testing the theory of market evolution in the largest transition economy; 2) 
accounting for hidden horizontal integration by using information on ownership; 3) applying a 
different estimation method that accounts for the existence of measurement errors.  
 
Finally our results provide additional supporting evidence that the evolution of markets in the 
Russian economy is influenced by the laws and regularities formulated by Sutton for 
advanced economies. However, this result holds only after accounting for the information on 
the ownership of companies. We show that in 2003 after accounting for hidden horizontal 
integration in exogenous sunk costs industries, the concentration level decreases with the 
market size growth. On the other hand the market concentration in the endogenous sunk costs 
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industries does not depend on the market size.  In 1991 before the economic transition, both 
types of industries resembled a similar pattern of market structure defined by the central 
planning agency.  Similar estimations on the set of disaggregated industries confirm these 
results which are robust to the sensitivity check of the differences in the number of 
observations for those two industries.  
 
The World Bank dataset of the ownership structure of large Russian companies allowed us to 
study several interesting aspects of the development of one of the largest transition markets, 
namely measuring the gap between control and ownership within the firms, estimating the 
impact of different types of owners on the productivity of their companies and studying the 
true market structure evolution. However, some of our estimations were limited by the fact 
that available ownership information included only one cross-section set of observations. In 
the future, the availability of ownership data for different points in time would allow to 
address a wider set of questions. The research results presented in this thesis could then serve 
as a benchmark for studying the process of ownership change. In addition estimating the same 
models on the extended dataset would be an interesting check of the robustness of our results.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: World Bank survey sector and sample coverage 
 
 
 
Table 9b: Determinants of the control-ownership gap existence: 
 probit estimation, marginal effects. 
 Pyramidal effect 
0  
Control effect 
0  
Total 
0  
Business groups 0.230** 0.094* 0.118** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.024) 
Foreigners -0.368** -0.212* -0.311** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.091) 
Federal government 0.084 -0.301** -0.128 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.067) 
Regional government -0.046 -0.100 -0.178* 
 (0.086) (0.081) (0.079) 
Size (log sales) -0.079** -0.027 -0.031** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
Capital/Sales -0.022 0.004 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) 
Sales/Labor 0.020 -0.009 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.016) 
Industry dummies + + + 
    
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
